68 FLRA No. 106
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS
PASSPORT SERVICES
(Agency)
and
NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
LOCAL 1998
(Petitioner/Union)
WA-RP-13-0068
_____
ORDER DENYING
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
May 29, 2015
_____
Before the Authority: Carol Waller Pope, Chairman, and
Ernest DuBester and Patrick Pizzella, Members
(Member Pizzella concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part)
I. Statement of the Case
The Union petitioned Federal Labor Relations Authority Acting Regional Director Greg A. Weddle (RD) to clarify, as relevant here, the bargaining-unit (unit) status of two Agency positions: (1) program analyst, in the Office of Acceptance Facilities Oversight (AFO analyst); and (2) management and program analyst, in the Office of Planning and Program Support, Strategic Planning Division (PPS/SP analyst).[1] In the attached decision, the RD found that, because AFO analysts do not perform audits within the meaning of § 7112(b)(7)[2] of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute), these positions should be included in the unit.[3] The RD also found that, although the PPS/SP position that is now encumbered by Frank Garcia is engaged in personnel work within the meaning of § 7112(b)(3)[4] of the Statute and should be excluded from the unit, the remaining five PPS/SP analyst positions should be included in the unit.[5] There are five substantive questions before us.
The first question is whether the RD committed clear and prejudicial error concerning substantial factual matters in finding that AFO analysts do not perform audits within the meaning of § 7112(b)(7) of the Statute. Because the Agency does not directly challenge any of the RD’s factual findings as unsupported by the record, and because the record supports the RD’s findings, we find that the answer is no.
The second question is whether the RD committed clear and prejudicial error concerning substantial factual matters because he failed to consider the AFO analysts’ role in overseeing the Agency’s summer-work-travel-monitoring program (summer program). Because the Agency’s challenge to the weight that the RD attributed to certain evidence does not provide a basis for finding that the RD committed clear and prejudicial errors in his factual findings, and because AFO analysts do not investigate Agency employees when monitoring the summer program, we find that the answer is no.
The third question is whether the RD failed to apply established law in finding that AFO analysts do not perform investigations or audits with the meaning of § 7112(b)(7) of the Statute. Because AFO analysts perform nothing more than a straightforward accounting of a passport acceptance facility’s compliance with normal Agency procedures, we find that the answer is no.
The fourth question is whether the RD committed clear and prejudicial error concerning substantial factual matters regarding whether the PPS/SP analyst position currently encumbered by Scott Muroski performs personnel work, and whether the RD failed to apply established law to these facts. Because the work performed by this position does not have a direct impact on personnel matters, we find that the answer is no.
The fifth question is whether the RD committed clear and prejducial error concerning substantial factual matters regarding whether the four PPS/SP analyst positions other than those encumbered by Scott Muroski and Frank Garcia perform personnel work, and whether the RD failed to apply established law to these facts. Because the parties agreed that Muroski would provide representative testimony regarding the duties of all six PPS/SP analyst positions at issue, and because the position encumbered by Muroski should be included within the unit, we find that the answer is no.
II. Background and RD’s Decision
The Agency’s primary mission, insofar as it concerns these proceedings, is to process applications for, and to issue, U.S. passports. The Union filed a petition in September 2013 seeking to clarify the unit status of four positions. The RD found that two of those positions should be excluded from the unit, and that two others – AFO analysts and PPS/SP analysts (with the exception of one incumbent’s, as explained below) – should be included within the unit. The Agency’s application challenges the RD’s determination that the AFO analyst and PPS/SP analyst positions should be included within the unit.
A. AFO Analysts
The AFO was established in 2010 to periodically inspect the approximately 7,550 passport acceptance facilities (acceptance facilities) nationwide. The Agency established the AFO in order to “improve the integrity of the passport acceptance process” by identifying which acceptance facilities were failing to adhere to the Agency’s procedures.[6] AFO analysts, which are classified as general schedule (GS)-0343-13 positions, perform duties that the Agency describes as audit functions, insofar as they perform on-site inspections of acceptance facilities. These duties involve assessing each facility’s level of compliance with Agency policy and identifying instances of noncompliance.
Acceptance facilities are usually post offices, libraries, or other public establishments to which the Agency has delegated the duty of accepting passport applications from the public. Acceptance-facility employees are not hired or employed by the Agency, and AFO analysts do not interact with Agency employees when conducting onsite inspections. AFO analysts submit reports of each inspection to their own supervisors and then to other Agency employees, in particular customer service managers (CSMs). CSMs are in charge of supervising and overseeing individual acceptance facilities and provide training and support needed by acceptance facilities to achieve full compliance with Agency standards.
If an AFO analyst’s report finds deficiencies within an acceptance facility, that facility is then subject to re-inspection by the AFO analyst. If deficiencies are found on successive inspections, the AFO analyst may recommend that the facility be suspended or deactivated.
The RD observed that AFO analysts interact almost exclusively with acceptance‑facility personnel who are not employed by the Agency, and “do[] not meet with, interview, or interact with Agency employees in the course of [their] onsite investigations.”[7] The RD noted that, in order to be excluded from a unit under § 7112(b)(7) of the Statute, an employee’s audits or investigations must “relat[e] to the work of individuals employed by [the] agency,”[8] and that investigations of non‑employees do not satisfy this standard.[9] The RD also found that, although AFO analysts submit their reports to CSMs, who are Agency employees, AFO analysts’ investigations are not designed to expose fraud or abuse on behalf of CSMs.[10] Further, the Agency did not establish that investigations of acceptance facilities have any bearing on the performance evaluations of CSMs. Accordingly, the RD found that AFO analysts do not meet the criteria for exclusion from the unit under § 7112(b)(7) of the Statute.
B. PPS/SP Analysts
The PPS/SP office is divided into three teams: the strategic planning team, the funds management team, and the statistics team. Although the Union sought clarification of six[11] PPS/SP analyst positions consisting of members of all three teams, only one PPS/SP analyst, Scott Muroski of the statistics team, testified. The PPS/SP division chief, who supervises these analysts, also testified as to the work performed by this group.
Muroski oversees the Agency’s passport demand forecast (demand forecast), which is a statistical model that estimates the number of U.S. passports that will be issued over the next two years. Muroski arrives at this estimate by weighing a combination of historical, economic, and political factors. The demand forecast is utilized by the PPS/SP office as part of its staffing model, which the Agency uses to determine future staffing requirements. For example, if the demand forecast predicts that a larger-than-normal number of passports will be issued in the next two years, the Agency may hire more staff to handle the increase in demand. PPS/SP analyst Frank Garcia is the primary analyst overseeing the Agency’s staffing model.
The RD determined that PPS/SP analyst Garcia should be excluded from the unit under § 7112(b)(3) of the Statute because his work on the Agency’s staffing model constitutes personnel work in more than a purely clerical capacity. However, the RD found that the five remaining PPS/SP analysts, including Muroski, do not exercise independent judgment with regard to staffing or other personnel actions, and should be included within the unit.
The Agency filed an application for review of the RD’s decision, and the Union filed an opposition to the Agency’s application.
III. Preliminary Matters
A. We will not consider the Union’s supplemental submission.
On April 6, 2015, the Union filed a supplemental submission – a motion to dismiss the Agency’s application for review – without requesting leave to file it under § 2429.26 of the Authority’s Regulations.[12] As the Union failed to request leave to file this supplemental submission, we will not consider it.
On April 17, 2015, the Agency filed a supplemental submission – a request for leave to file a response to the Union’s motion to dismiss and request to amend certificates of service as appropriate. Where the Authority declines to consider a document, the Authority also declines to consider a subsequent response to that document because the response is moot.[13] Consistent with this precedent, as we are not considering the Union’s supplemental submission, we will not consider the Agency’s supplemental submission, which responds to the Union’s filing.
B. We deny the Agency’s request for leave to file a response to the Union’s opposition.
On April 30, 2015, the Agency filed another supplemental submission – a request for leave to file a response to the Union’s opposition. This request did not include a response to the Union’s opposition; however, on May 27, 2015, the Agency filed its response.
The Authority’s Regulations provide that the Authority may, in its discretion, grant leave to file “other documents” as deemed appropriate.[14] The Authority has granted such leave where, for example, the supplemental submission would respond to arguments raised for the first time in an opposing party’s filing.[15] The Agency requests leave to respond to the Union’s opposition, claiming that the Union’s opposition “discusses issues not raised in the Agency’s [a]pplication, and contains inaccurate statements of fact.”[16] However, as set forth in detail below, the issues raised by the Agency’s application for review can be resolved regardless of the contents of the Union’s opposition. Accordingly, we deny the Agency’s request for leave to file a response to the Union’s opposition.
On May 11, 2015, the Union filed another supplemental submission – an opposition to the Agency’s April 30 supplemental submission. As we are denying the Agency’s request for leave, the Union’s supplemental submission is moot.
IV. Analysis and Conclusions
A. AFO Analysts
1. The Agency has not demonstrated that the RD committed clear and prejudicial error regarding a substantial factual matter relating to AFO analysts’ oversight of acceptance facilities.
The Authority may grant an application for review if it is demonstrated that the RD committed clear and prejudicial error concerning a substantial factual matter.[17] Regarding AFO analysts’ role in investigating passport acceptance facilities, the Agency contends that the RD committed prejudicial error in finding: (1) that “[t]he Agency presented no evidence to establish that the [AFO analysts’] inspections and summary reports have any bearing on the CSM’s performance rating or represent anything more than a straightforward accounting of an acceptance facility’s compliance with the [Passport Agent Reference Guide (PARG), the Agency’s policy and procedural manual to which acceptance facilities must adhere],”; and (2) that the Agency did not “present evidence to demonstrate that passport acceptance facility inspections are designed to uncover waste, fraud, abuse, wrongdoing, or misconduct on the part of [CSMs] or [their] subordinates.”[18]
The Agency does not challenge these factual findings as unsupported by the record. Rather, the Agency cites purportedly contrary evidence to substantiate its claim that the RD erred. For example, the Agency notes that the AFO office was created as a result of an investigation conducted by the Government Accountability Office and the Agency’s Office of Inspector General that “revealed vulnerabilities and improprieties” in acceptance facilities’ handling of passport applications.[19] The Agency also cites to testimony asserting that AFO analysts are responsible for “reveal[ing] . . . ignorance of duty by the CSM[s],”[20] and that AFO analysts “can uncover a lack of attention to job responsibilities by the CSM.”[21]
This evidence cited by the Agency does not directly contradict the RD’s findings. The Agency’s disagreement with the weight the RD ascribed to certain evidence does not provide a basis for finding that the RD committed clear errors in making factual findings.[22] Moreover, the RD’s factual findings are supported by the record. The RD found that AFO analyst investigative reports do not have any bearing on the performance ratings of CSMs.[23] This is supported by the testimony of AFO analyst Michael Garofano, who stated that he did not know of any CSMs whose evaluations suffered due to the investigations of AFO analysts.[24]
The RD also found that AFO analyst reports are not designed to uncover waste, fraud, abuse, or wrongdoing on behalf of CSMs.[25] The Agency presented no evidence of fraud, waste, or abuse on the part of CSMs uncovered by AFO analysts during their investigations. The only example of unsatisfactory performance exposed by AFO analysts concerned acceptance facility personnel leaving sensitive passport applications “in plain view in an area accessible to the public.”[26] These errors, which were not committed by Agency employees, do not constitute fraud, abuse, or misconduct on behalf of Agency employees. As the Agency presented no other evidence of any waste, fraud, abuse, or wrongdoing uncovered by the audits of AFO analysts, the RD’s findings are supported by the record.
The Agency also contends that the hearing officer committed prejudicial error by restricting testimony regarding how AFO analysts’ work “impacts the performance rating, and . . . employment status, of CSMs.”[27] Specifically, when the Agency representative asked a witness to describe the impact of including AFO analysts within the unit, and the witness mentioned CSMs, the hearing officer initially interrupted to state that “[t]he [CSM] isn’t the issue here.”[28] According to the Agency, this interruption constituted prejudicial error.[29] However, a review of the record shows that the witness was then allowed to answer the question in full, and that the hearing officer did not prevent the witness from offering a complete response.[30]
The Agency further claims that the hearing officer erred by preventing AFO analyst Garofano from opining on what impact, if any, being included in the unit would have on his work.[31] However, following the hearing officer’s objection to this question, the Agency representative responded by withdrawing the question.[32] Furthermore, Garofano testified extensively regarding his duties as an AFO analyst,[33] and the Agency has not demonstrated how precluding him from answering this solitary question rises to the level of prejudicial error.
Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, we find that the RD did not commit clear and prejudicial error concerning factual matters relating to AFO analysts’ role in investigating acceptance facilities.
2. The Agency has not demonstrated that the RD committed clear and prejudicial error regarding a substantial factual matter relating to AFO analysts’ oversight of the summer program.
The Agency also argues that the RD ignored the AFO analysts’ role in the Agency’s summer program.[34] The Agency asserts that the RD “focused exclusively on the relationship between AFO analysts’ audits of passport acceptance facilities,” and “ignored all of” the Agency’s testimony regarding the summer program.[35] However, an argument that the RD ignored certain evidence merely challenges the weight the RD ascribes to such evidence.[36] As stated above, such challenges do not demonstrate that the RD committed clear and prejudicial error concerning a substantial factual matter.[37]
Moreover, the record supports the RD’s decision not to exclude AFO analysts from the unit due to their connection to the summer program. The summer program pairs international students with various employers otherwise not associated with the Agency.[38] AFO analysts were tasked with overseeing this program and submitting reports to the Agency’s Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA).[39] However, the record reflects that AFO analysts interact almost exclusively with the summer program’s participants and their various employers, and any interaction with Agency employees is limited to the submission of reports to the ECA.[40] As investigations or audits of non-Agency employees do not warrant exclusion under § 7112(b)(7) of the Statute,[41] the Agency has not established that the RD committed a clear and prejudicial error of fact regarding the AFO analysts’ role in overseeing the summer program.
3. The Agency has not demonstrated that the RD failed to apply established law relating to the AFO analyst positions.
The Authority may grant an application for review if a party demonstrates that the RD failed to apply established law.[42] In determining whether a specified investigative or audit position is properly excluded from a unit, the Authority considers whether: (1) the incumbents are “primarily engaged in investigation or audit functions”; (2) these functions “relat[e] to the work of individuals employed by an agency whose duties directly affect the internal security of the agency”; and (3) these functions are “undertaken to ensure that the duties are discharged honestly and with integrity.”[43] A position will be excluded from a unit under § 7112(b)(7) only if audits or investigative work constitute a preponderance of the position’s overall duties.[44]
Generally, the Authority has found that § 7112(b)(7) applies where individuals “perform[] internal investigations of employee wrongdoing and fraud,” with the potential for uncovering “employee fraud, misuse of funds, or malfeasance,”[45] as well as where individuals investigate “fraud, waste, and abuse.”[46] However, this standard is not limited to employees who perform investigations or audits relating to “fraud, waste, or abuse,” but includes any audit or investigation that relates to the “honesty and integrity” of particular types of employees.[47]
The Agency argues that the RD erred in finding that AFO analysts are not responsible for ensuring that CSMs perform their duties “honestly and with integrity.”[48] The Agency alleges that AFO analysts investigate the honesty and integrity of CSMs by reporting on the quality of CSMs’ job performance, which is necessary to deter “fraud, neglect of job duty, and other unsatisfactory performance.”[49]
However, as discussed above, the RD found that the Agency presented no evidence to show that AFO analyst investigations are designed to uncover fraud or abuse committed by CSMs or their subordinates.[50] The RD also found that AFO analysts’ investigations and reports represent nothing more than “a straightforward accounting of an acceptance facility’s compliance with the PARG.” [51] These findings demonstrate that AFO analysts’ primary function is to ensure that acceptance facilities are not deviating from Agency standards such as the PARG. The Authority has previously held that merely performing “procedural quality control checks to ensure [that employees] compl[y] with generally accepted government . . . standards” is not sufficient to exclude employees from a unit under § 7112(b)(7).[52] Accordingly, consistent with this precedent, we find that the Agency has not established that the RD failed to apply established law regarding his decision to include AFO analysts within the unit.
B. PPS/SP Analysts
1. The RD did not commit clear and prejudicial error concerning substantial factual matters relating to the PPS/SP analyst position encumbered by Scott Muroski, and did not fail to apply established law to these facts.
Section 7112(b)(3) of the Statute excludes from units any employee “engaged in personnel work in other than a purely clerical capacity.”[53] A position is excluded under this provision where: the character and extent of the employee’s involvement in personnel work is not merely clerical in nature; the employee’s duties are not performed in a routine manner; and the employee exercises independent judgment and discretion.[54]
As stated above, the RD found that the PPS/SP analyst position that is encumbered by Garcia should be excluded from the unit because his work on the Agency’s staffing model constitutes “personnel work” under § 7112(b)(3) of the Statute.[55] Specifically, the RD found that Garcia “reviews expected workload, staff composition, and expected work production so that the Agency can determine . . . correct staffing levels.”[56] As such, the RD concluded that Garcia exercises independent judgment over decisions that significantly impact the Agency’s personnel decisions.[57] The RD determined that, although the five remaining PPS/SP analysts’ job performance is “ultimately a factor in the Agency’s determination of staffing levels,” the Agency failed to establish that they exercise independent judgment with regard to personnel actions.[58]
The Agency argues that the RD erred in including these five PPS/SP analysts, and “the [p]osition [o]ccupied by Scott Muroski in [p]articular,” within the unit,[59] and alleges that “established law . . . warrants reconsideration” of the RD’s decision.[60] Regarding Muroski, the Agency asserts that he exercises independent judgment over recommendations that could significantly impact the Agency’s personnel decisions.[61] Muroski is the lead analyst for the Agency’s demand forecast, which predicts the number of passport applications that will be received within the next two fiscal years.[62] The PPS/SP division chief opined that Muroski exercises a certain amount of independent judgment in developing the results of the demand forecast,[63] and asserted that the demand forecast “directly impacts” the outcome of the staffing model.[64] Accordingly, the Agency argues that the PPS/SP analyst position encumbered by Muroski should be excluded from the unit under § 7112(b)(3) because the incumbent wields significant influence over personnel matters.[65]
However, the PPS/SP division chief also testified that the demand forecast is only one of several factors that are used in formulating the staffing model.[66] He further stated that the PPS/SP analyst position currently encumbered by Frank Garcia is in charge of assigning weight to each of these several factors, and ultimately controls each factor’s impact on the outcome of the staffing model.[67] Thus, the position encumbered by Muroski does not have a dispositive impact on the outcome of the staffing model, and the record evidence does not establish that the work performed by Muroski could have a “direct impact on the elimination of jobs,” as is required to be excluded from the unit under § 7112(b)(3).[68] Accordingly, we find that the Agency has not established that the RD committed prejudicial errors of fact relating to the PPS/SP position encumbered by Muroski, or that the RD failed to apply established law to those facts.
2. The RD did not commit clear and prejudicial error concerning a substantial factual matter in finding that the remaining four PPS/SP analysts, other than Garcia and Muroski, should be included within the unit, or fail to apply established law to these facts.
As stated above, the RD determined that all PPS/SP analysts other than Garcia should be included within the unit.[69] The Agency argues that this decision was reached in error for two reasons. First, the Agency claims that it was denied the opportunity to present testimony regarding the job duties of the four PPS/SP analyst positions other than those encumbered by Garcia and Muroski.[70] The Agency contends that Muroski, the only PPS/SP analyst allowed to testify, lacks knowledge of the duties of his peer analysts (other than duties shared between all PPS/SP analysts), and could not provide adequate testimony regarding their responsibilities.[71] As such, the Agency requests that this matter be remanded to the RD in order to clarify the record regarding the duties performed by the remaining four PPS/SP analysts other than Garcia and Muroski.[72]
Second, the Agency argues that the RD committed a prejudicial error of fact by ignoring the shared nature of the duties of all PPS/SP analysts.[73] The Agency cites the division chief’s testimony that the PPS/SP analysts perform cross-team training, as well as Muroski’s testimony that he works within all three teams that make up the PPS/SP office.[74] Moreover, the Agency asserts that each PPS/SP analyst serves as acting division chief on a rotational basis,[75] and that they are also required to stand in for their coworkers in the event that one of them should be absent from, or leave, the Agency.[76] Accordingly, the Agency argues that if one PPS/SP analyst is excluded from the unit, then all six must be excluded as well.[77]
However, the Agency concedes that “[t]he parties agreed upon . . . Muroski” to provide representative testimony regarding the duties of all six PPS/SP analyst positions (including Garcia and Muroski).[78] Although the Agency claims that it was denied “a full and fair opportunity” to present the entirety of its case because the hearing officer “forced the parties to agree upon one incumbent” to provide representative testimony,[79] there is no record evidence to support this claim – despite the fact that, at the hearing, the hearing officer gave both parties the opportunity to present additional information and arguments.[80] Given these circumstances, we find that Muroski’s testimony was representative of all six PPS/SP analyst positions. Accordingly, we find that the Agency has not shown that the RD committed clear and prejudicial error concerning a substantial factual matter in holding that the four PPS/SP analyst positions other than those encumbered by Garcia and Muroski should be included within the unit, or that the RD failed to apply established law to those facts.
V. Order
We deny the Agency’s application for review.
Member Pizzella, concurring, in part,
and dissenting, in part:
I agree with the majority that AFO analysts should not be excluded from the bargaining unit (unit).
Section 7112(b)(7) of the Federal Service Labor‑Management Relations Statute (the Statute) excludes from a unit any “employee primarily engaged in investigation or audit functions.”1 Section 7112(b)(7) also requires that such duties must “relat[e] to the work of individuals employed by [the] agency whose duties directly affect the internal security of the agency, but only if the functions are undertaken to ensure that the duties are discharged honestly and with integrity.”2 The majority interprets this to mean that only those auditors or investigators who investigate the activities of employees of the agency may be excluded under this provision.3
I question, however, whether the phrase “relating to the work of individuals employed by the agency”4 should be interpreted that narrowly. In U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Audit Service, Southeast Region (Naval Audit Service), the Authority held that employees who “conduct[] audit functions related to matters external to the [agency]” may be excluded under § 7112(b)(7), so long as “an investigation of [agency] employees may result.”5
But, in this case, the Agency failed to demonstrate that the oversight of passport facilities, which the AFO analysts perform, “may result” in the investigation of Agency employees.6
But I would not conclude, as does the majority, that the oversight of agency programs or facilities, which are staffed by contractors or other non-agency employees (such as the passport acceptance facilities here), could not exclude these employees if the record demonstrated that the oversight duties performed (on behalf of the Agency, by contractors or other non-Agency employees) “ensure that the duties are discharged honestly and with integrity.”7
It is also noteworthy that the AFO office was established after investigations by the Agency’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) revealed performance deficiencies at some of the Agency’s passport acceptance facilities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in U.S. DHS, U.S. CBP v. FLRA recently held that investigations performed by employees of an agency’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) cannot be hindered by the collective-bargaining process.8 I believe that we should heed the court’s caution concerning how the collective-bargaining process could potentially hamstring the mission of OIGs throughout the federal government. In this case, however, there is no indication that the AFO office is part of, or shares investigatory responsibilities with, the OIG.
Accordingly, I would conclude that the oversight of agency programs or facilities, which are staffed by contractors or other non-agency employees (such as the passport acceptance facilities here), are duties which could exclude such employees when it is demonstrated that the oversight performed “ensure[s] that the duties are discharged honestly and with integrity”9 or as in the case of Naval Audit Service, such investigations have the potential to expose serious waste, fraud, or criminal wrongdoing.10
I also do not agree with the majority insofar as they conclude that the five PPS/SP analyst positions (other than the one encumbered by Frank Garcia) should be included in the unit.
In U.S. Department of the Army Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, Ft. Campbell, Kentucky (Ft. Campbell), the Authority held that, where employees exercise independent judgment over recommendations or decisions that can have “a direct impact on the elimination of jobs,” they should be excluded from the bargaining unit under § 7112(b)(3) of the Statute because their judgment “may be clouded . . . consciously or unconsciously . . . by their desire to advance the interests of the bargaining[-]unit employees rather than the best interests of management.”11
According to my colleagues, the duties performed by another PPS/SP analyst, Scott Muroski, do not have a “direct impact” on personnel decisions, and that the demand forecast which he prepares is “only one of several factors” that affects the Agency’s staffing model.12 In this respect, the majority seems to interpret the meaning of the term, “directly affects,” as though it means the same thing as exclusively affects.13
The record demonstrates that Muroski regularly exercises significant independent judgment in preparing the Agency’s demand forecast which predicts the number of passport applications that will be received within the next two fiscal years.14 Not only does Muroski serve as the lead analyst in preparing that forecast, he is also recognized as its “subject matter expert.”15 Furthermore, the demand forecast is “one of the largest drivers of”16 and “directly impacts”17 the Agency’s staffing model.
Therefore, even though other factors may go into the development of the Agency’s staffing model, the manipulation of the demand forecast could “directly impact the elimination of jobs.”18
Therefore, I would conclude that the majority’s decision to include Muroski in the unit is inconsistent with the precedent set forth in Ft. Campbell. In fact, it creates precisely the conflict of interest that § 7112(b)(3) was designed to prevent.
And, because Muroski’s testimony was representative of all six PPS/SP analyst positions,19 the remaining four PPS/SP analyst positions should be excluded as well.
Thank you.
[1] RD’s Decision at 1.
[2] 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(7).
[3] RD’s Decision at 9.
[4] 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(3).
[5] RD’s Decision at 11.
[6] Id. at 3.
[7] Id. at 8.
[8] Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(7)).
[9] Id. (citing U.S. DOJ, Fed. BOP, Seagoville, Tex., 65 FLRA 239, 241 (2010) (BOP Seagoville)).
[10] Id. at 9.
[11] Although the Agency refers throughout its application to eight PPS/SP analysts, e.g., Application at 19, the record reflects that there are only six positions at issue. See RD’s Decision at 5.
[12] 5 C.F.R. § 2429.26.
[13] Broad. Bd. of Governors, 66 FLRA 380, 384 (2011).
[14] 5 C.F.R. § 2429.26; U.S. DHS, ICE, 64 FLRA 1003, 1005 (2010) (ICE) (citing Cong. Research Employees Ass’n, IFPTE, Local 75, 59 FLRA 994, 999 (2004)).
[15] ICE, 64 FLRA at 1005 (citation omitted).
[16] Agency’s Apr. 30 Supp. Submission at 2.
[17] 5 C.F.R. § 2422.31(c)(3)(iii).
[18] Application at 5 (quoting RD’s Decision at 9).
[19] Id. at 6.
[20] Id. (citing Hr’g Tr., Mar. 20, 2014 (Hr’g Tr.) at 23).
[21] Id. at 8 (citing Hr’g Tr. at 91).
[22] USDA Forest Serv., Albuquerque, N.M., 64 FLRA 239, 242 (2009) (Forest Serv., Albuquerque) (citing U.S. DOD, Pentagon Force Prot. Agency, Wash., D.C., 62 FLRA 164, 170 (2007); Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 59 FLRA 858, 862 (2004)).
[23] RD’s Decision at 9.
[24] Hr’g Tr. at 154:4.
[25] RD’s Decision at 9.
[26] Application at 9.
[27] Id. at 7; see also id. at 11, 15-16.
[28] Hr’g Tr. at 39:9-10.
[29] Application at 7.
[30] See Hr’g Tr. at 39:11-40:10.
[31] Application at 11 (citing Hr’g Tr. at 144).
[32] Hr’g Tr. at 144:9-10.
[33] See id. at 117:11-145-25.
[34] Application at 16-18.
[35] Id. at 18.
[36] U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, Dover Air Force Base, Del., 66 FLRA 916, 921 (2012) (internal citation omitted).
[37] See Forest Serv., Albuquerque, 64 FLRA at 242 (2009).
[38] Application at 16.
[39] Id.
[40] Hr’g Tr. at 35:14-36:17.
[41] U.S. DOJ, Fed. BOP, U.S. Penitentiary McReary, Pine Knot, Ky., 63 FLRA 153, 155 (2009).
[42] 5 C.F.R. § 2422.31(c)(3)(i).
[43] BOP Seagoville, 65 FLRA at 240-41 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(7)).
[44] See id. at 241.
[45] Small Bus. Admin., 34 FLRA 392, 402 (1990).
[46] U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Naval Audit Serv. Se. Region, 46 FLRA 512, 519 (1992).
[47] AFGE, Local 3529, 57 FLRA 633, 638 (2001) (Local 3529) (citing U.S. DOJ, BOP, Marion, Ill., 55 FLRA 1243, 1248 (2000)).
[48] Application at 6-11.
[49] Id. at 8-9.
[50] RD’s Decision at 9.
[51] Id.
[52] Local 3529, 57 FLRA at 638.
[53] 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(3).
[54] U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Navy Undersea Warfare Ctr., Keyport, Wash., 68 FLRA 416, 436 (2015) (citing VA, N. Cal. Health Care Sys., Martinez, Cal., 66 FLRA 522, 524 (2012)).
[55] RD’s Decision at 11.
[56] Id.
[57] Id.
[58] Id.
[59] Application at 26.
[60] Id. at 34 (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Army Headquarters, 101st Airborne Div., Ft. Campbell, Ky., 36 FLRA 598 (1990) (Ft. Campbell)).
[61] Id. at 26-34.
[62] Hr’g Tr. at 188:7-10.
[63] Id. at 190:1-14.
[64] Id. at 188:21
[65] Application at 26-34.
[66] Hr’g Tr. at 194:4-196:24.
[67] Id. at 196:8-24.
[68] Ft. Campbell, 36 FLRA at 604 (emphasis added).
[69] RD’s decision at 11.
[70] Application at 19.
[71] Id. at 20.
[72] Id. at 23.
[73] Id.
[74] Hr’g Tr. at 204:24-25:2, 230:19-231:23.
[75] Application at 21.
[76] Id. at 24.
[77] Id. at 26.
[78] Id. at 19.
[79] Id. at 19, 23.
[80] Hr’g Tr. at 457:25-458:8.
1 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(7).
2 Id. (emphases added).
3 Majority at 8-9.
4 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(7).
5 U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Naval Audit Serv., Se. Region, 46 FLRA 512, 515 (1992).
6 Id.
7 Id. at 517 (emphasis added) (citing U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 34 FLRA 392, 400-02 (1990)).
8 751 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
9 Naval Audit Service, 46 FLRA at 517.
10 Id. at 515.
11 U.S. Dep’t of the Army Headquarters, 101st Airborne Div., Ft. Campbell, Ky., 36 FLRA 598, 604 (1990) (Ft. Campbell).
12 Majority at 11.
13 See id.
14 Hr’g Tr. at 188:7-10.
15 Id. at 190:1-14, 192:21.
16 Id. at 233:5-6.
17 Id. at 188:21
18 Ft. Campbell, 36 FLRA at 604.
19 Majority at 11.