(1) “[a]ll professional employees of the [Agency] assigned to:  the Headquarters Bureaus and Offices in the Baltimore metropolitan area, including . . . [ODAR] in its Headquarters in the Washington metropolitan area”;^[1] and

 

 

 

 

The RD applied the principles set forth in Department of the Army Headquarters, Fort Dix, Fort Dix, New Jersey (Fort Dix).^[4] Under Fort Dix, “new employees are automatically included in an existing [bargaining] unit where their positions fall within the express terms of [an existing bargaining-]unit certification and their inclusion would not render the [bargaining] unit inappropriate.”^[5] In addition, the RD stated that this holding applies “not only to new employees hired into previously existing positions, but also to employees in newly []created positions that fall within the express terms of the existing certification.”^[6]

 

The RD applied this legal framework to both petitions and found that the employees should not be automatically included in the existing units. Specifically, she found that the express terms of the certifications only apply to employees “assigned to” and “of” “Headquarters Bureaus and Offices [(HQBOs)] in the                Baltimore, Maryland metropolitan area [(Baltimore)],” and “ODAR in its Headquarters in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area [(D.C.)].”^[7] Citing Authority precedent,^[8] the RD found that “assigned to” and “of” refer to an “organizational assignment rather than a geographic one”^[9] and that the certifications address geographic assignments separately. Accordingly, she interpreted the certifications as including employees who are:  (1) organizationally assigned to Agency HQBOs – which the RD later abbreviated as “Agency Headquarters”^[10] – and physically located in Baltimore; and (2) organizationally assigned to ODAR Headquarters and physically located in D.C.

 

Turning to the NCAC East employees, the RD found that NCAC East organizationally falls under ODAR and its employees perform ODAR functions, but are physically located in Baltimore. Applying the express terms of the certifications to the employees, the RD found that although the employees are physically located in Baltimore, the employees are organizationally “assigned to” and “of” ODAR, not Agency HQBOs.^[11] Further, she found that the employees do not work for ODAR Headquarters in D.C. Accordingly, the RD found that the new employees cannot “be considered Agency [HQBO] employees in the Baltimore area, nor are they ODAR Headquarters employees in [D.C.]”^[12]  

 

 

 

                The Union contends that the RD failed to apply established law^[13] under the Fort Dix doctrine when she concluded that the employees are not automatically included in the existing units.^[14] Specifically, the Union argues that the RD failed to:  (1) “fully” analyze the express terms of the existing-unit certifications;             (2) interpret Fort Dix broadly; and (3) afford the Union an opportunity to present witness testimony.^[15] As discussed below, the Union has not established that the RD failed to apply established law under the Fort Dix doctrine. Accordingly, we deny the Union’s application for review.

 

                Under the Authority’s Fort Dix doctrine, “[n]ew employees are automatically included in an existing bargaining unit where their positions fall within the express terms of a bargaining certificat[ion] and where their inclusion does not render the bargaining unit inappropriate.”^[16] 

 

                Regarding its first argument, the Union asserts that the RD failed to investigate whether the employees of NCAC East “work for” Agency HQBOs.^[17] The Union misunderstands the RD’s decision. The RD addressed whether the employees “work for” HQBOs when she determined whether these employees were “assigned to” and “of” Agency HQBOs or ODAR Headquarters within the meaning of the certifications.^[18] She determined, and it is undisputed,^[19] that the NCAC East employees are organizationally assigned to and work for ODAR in Baltimore, not Agency HQBOs in Baltimore or ODAR Headquarters in D.C.^[20] 

                The Union further argues that the RD failed to investigate whether ODAR itself is an HQBO.^[21] Once again, the Union misunderstands the RD’s decision. As the RD recognized, the certifications specifically include ODAR Headquarters in D.C. as an example of an Agency HQBO. But as the RD also explained, the certifications do not expressly include any                   sub-component of ODAR. Therefore, although the Union claims that ODAR – as a “subordinate [Agency] component”^[22] – reports to an Agency HQBO or that ODAR’s chain of command goes through an Agency HQBO, this claim is not inconsistent with the RD’s determination that the certifications only extend to ODAR “employees who are both organizationally assigned to ODAR Headquarters and physically located in [D.C.].”^[23]

 

                Regarding its second argument, the Union claims that the RD erred by not “broadly” applying the Fort Dix doctrine, citing NFFE, FD-1,                   IAMAW, AFL-CIO (NFFE).^[24] But the holding in NFFE is inapplicable here. NFFE held that Fort Dix’s automatic-inclusion principles should be applied “broadly” to cover not only “new” employees, but also existing employees who are newly unrepresented.^[25] Here, the RD found, and there is no dispute, that the only employees at issue are “new” employees. Because applying Fort Dix “broadly” to extend it to existing employees is not an issue in this case, NFFE is inapplicable. 

 

                Under § 2422.30 of the Authority’s Regulations, RDs have broad discretion to investigate a representation petition “as the [RD] deems necessary.”^[27]  An RD “may determine, on the basis of the investigation . . . that there are sufficient facts not in dispute to form the basis for a decision or that, even where some facts are in dispute, the record contains sufficient evidence on which to base a decision.”^[28]

                The Union fails to demonstrate how the RD’s conduct of the investigation prejudiced the Union’s presentation of its case. The Union does not challenge the RD’s statement that she “conducted an investigation and both parties provided information and their respective positions.”^[29] Therefore, the Union was not precluded during the investigation from presenting any evidence or arguments that it considered relevant to the RD’s consideration of its petitions.^[30] Accordingly, the Union fails to demonstrate that the RD abused her discretion or failed to apply established law in this regard.

 

 

 

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