Association of Administrative Law Judges, International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (Union) and Social Security Administration, Office of Hearing Operations (Agency)

74 FLRA No. 53                                                                                                                   

ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PROFESSIONAL

AND TECHNICAL ENGINEERS

(Union)

and

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF HEARING OPERATIONS

(Agency)

0‑AR‑6035

_____

DECISION

February 5, 2026

_____

Before the Authority:  Colleen Duffy Kiko, Chairman,

and Anne Wagner and Charles O. Arrington, Members

(Member Arrington concurring)

I.                   Statement of the Case

The Union filed a grievance alleging that the Agency violated the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement and law based on the manner in which it assigns cases to administrative law judges (ALJs).  Arbitrator Joshua M. Javits issued an award denying the grievance.  The Union filed exceptions challenging the award on contrary-to-law, exceeded‑authority, nonfact, and essence grounds.  Because the Union fails to demonstrate that the award is deficient, we deny the exceptions.

II.        Background and Arbitrator’s Award

The ALJs adjudicate claims for disability benefits brought by claimants, who may or may not be represented.  Before 2023, the Agency would assign cases to ALJs after case intake, but before scheduling a hearing.  An Agency scheduler would then contact the claimant regarding availability for a hearing, and subsequently would schedule the hearing for a time when the assigned ALJ was available.

In 2023, the Agency implemented a new system that allows claimants’ representatives (representatives) to electronically provide the weekdays and times that they are available for a hearing.  The Agency then uses that information – with certain exceptions – to schedule a hearing that matches the representative’s availability and then assign the case to the next ALJ who is available at the scheduled hearing time (case‑assignment system).

The Union filed a grievance alleging that the Agency violated Articles 5, 13, and 16 of the parties’ agreement (Article 5, 13, and 16, respectively), and a provision of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) concerning ALJ assignments,^[1] because the Agency was not assigning cases “in rotation” under the case-assignment system.^[2]  The Agency denied the grievance, and the parties proceeded to arbitration.

The parties did not stipulate an issue.  The Arbitrator framed the pertinent issue as whether “the Agency should – or must – assign cases in the order in which they come into the office, prior to contact between an Agency scheduler and [representatives].”^[3]

To resolve this issue, the Arbitrator considered whether the Agency was assigning cases to ALJs in rotation consistent with the parties’ agreement and the APA.  He found that three provisions of the parties’ agreement – Article 5, Section 5.B (Article 5.B); Article 13, Section B (Article 13.B); and Article 16, Section 1.A.3 (Article 16.1.A.3) – all provide, in pertinent part, that the ALJs “shall be assigned cases in rotation so far as practicable.”^[4]  He also found Article 5, Section 5.A (Article 5.A) provides that “[a]ssignment of cases shall be done in a fair and equitable manner.”^[5]  In addition, he set out the APA’s pertinent wording, which provides that “ALJs shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable.”^[6]

The Arbitrator described the Union’s position as grieving “a change made in the [Agency’s] procedures from assigning ALJs to cases on a strict [f]irst-[i]n-[f]irst[-o]ut (FIFO) basis or ‘rotational basis’ – to one in which consideration is given to the availability of [representatives] before assigning ALJs cases.”^[7]  Before the Arbitrator, the Union asserted that the case-assignment system, “where there must be a ‘match’ between an ALJ’s schedule and a[ representative’s] availability,” is not an assignment of cases “in rotation” under the APA.^[8]  The Union also asserted that “this case relates to the Agency’s assignment of cases on a rotation basis and in a fair and equitable manner.”^[9]  The Union contended that the purpose of the APA’s rotation requirement is “to ensure that ALJs are treated equally and to have cases assigned in a fair manner,” which is the same as Article 5.A’s purpose.^[10]  

The Union further argued before the Arbitrator that the case-assignment system “is precisely the type of assignment system the APA was designed to prevent”^[11] because it allows representatives to “forum shop[]” by matching their availability to the typical schedule of an ALJ who has a known record of granting a high percentage of disability claims.^[12]  The Union contended that this forum shopping results in some ALJs never being assigned a particular representative’s cases, or in some ALJs being assigned more unrepresented claimants. 

The Agency countered that the case-assignment system “complie[s] with the APA mandate to assign cases to ALJs . . .‘in rotation so far as . . . practica[ble]’” because the Agency assigns cases to ALJs “at one of two times.”^[13]  Specifically, the Agency explained that certain cases requiring immediate attention are assigned to the next available ALJ when the relevant Agency office receives them, and the remainder “are assigned to ALJs in rotation at the time [the case is] scheduled for hearing.”^[14]  According to the Agency, “[representative] availability does not affect rotation, as cases are still assigned to the next ALJ in succession after matching a [representative’s] availability with an ALJ’s calendar” and considering other factors previously “agreed to” by the parties. ^[15]  Moreover, the Agency contended that the Union’s concerns were based on “anecdotal reports”^[16] but that there was “no evidence that [representatives] are engaging in forum shopping or attempting to appear[] before preferred ALJs.”^[17]

The Arbitrator “note[d] that the Union ha[d] a legitimate concern” about the case‑assignment system, and he found the Union’s assertions about the system’s “potential flaws . . . to be credible.”^[18]  He further noted that the “flaws” hypothetically could result in forum shopping or other abuses,^[19] but he concluded “this does not automatically render the system biased towards certain [c]laimants” nor does it necessarily result in representatives forum shopping.^[20]  The Arbitrator then found that the Union’s “evidence, while persuasive in some ways,” was “anecdotal,” “subjective in nature,” and “not fully supported by statistical evidence” or “data.”^[21]  He further stated that “statistical evidence . . . would have supported [the Union’s] position that the case[‑]assignment [system] was neither fair nor equitable.”^[22]

The Arbitrator “accept[ed] that Agency management may in some way need to consider [representatives’] availability when assigning cases to ALJs,” so long as such consideration does not “prejudice the system of adjudication” and “undermine the fair and equitable assignment of cases.”^[23]  In reaching his conclusions, the Arbitrator referenced the Agency’s argument that it “continues to assign cases on a rotation basis . . . after the various factors are examined.”^[24]  He further noted the Agency’s assertions that the case-assignment system is rotational “so far as . . . practicable” because “[i]t is not practicable to ignore [representatives’] availability and schedules in assigning cases,” which “would inevitably delay cases” to claimants’ detriment. ^[25]  Ultimately, he rejected the Union’s arguments and concluded that the Union failed to demonstrate that the case‑assignment system violated the parties’ agreement or the APA.  On this basis, the Arbitrator denied the grievance.^[26]

The Union filed exceptions on May 23, 2025, and the Agency filed an opposition on June 23, 2025.

III.       Analysis and Conclusions

A.                The Union does not demonstrate that the award is contrary to law.

The Union argues that the award is contrary to the APA.^[27]  When an exception involves an award’s consistency with law, the Authority reviews any question of law raised by the exception and the award de novo.^[28]  In applying the standard of de novo review, the Authority assesses whether the arbitrator’s legal conclusions – not an arbitrator’s underlying reasoning – are consistent with the applicable standard of law.^[29]  In making that assessment, the Authority defers to the arbitrator’s underlying factual findings unless the excepting party establishes they are nonfacts.^[30]  In addition, exceptions that are based on a misunderstanding of an award do not demonstrate the award is contrary to law.^[31]

First, the Union contends that the Arbitrator “conflat[ed] the APA’s rotational case[-]assignment mandate with the [parties’ agreement’s] requirement for fair and equitable case assignment[.]”^[32]  According to the Union, the Arbitrator assessed only that contractual requirement^[33] before concluding that the Union “failed to establish a violation of the APA.”^[34]  The Union is correct that the Arbitrator did not expressly state that the case-assignment system complied with the APA’s rotation requirement.  However, “when evaluating exceptions to an arbitration award, the Authority considers the award as a whole.”^[35]

Contrary to the Union’s argument, the Arbitrator explained that he had considered both parties’ arguments regarding whether the case-assignment system was consistent with the APA.^[36]  He then detailed the Agency’s assertions about how the case-assignment system was rotational.^[37]  While the Arbitrator discussed the contractual “fair and equitable” wording, he did so in the course of evaluating the Union’s concerns about the “potential flaws” in the case-assignment system, and the Agency’s arguments that consideration of availability and other factors rendered the case-assignment system more fair and equitable than the prior system.^[38]  The Arbitrator found that any consideration of availability should not “undermine the fair and equitable assignment of cases,”^[39] and he cited the Agency’s argument that the case-assignment system is rotational “so far as . . . practicable” because “[i]t is not practicable to ignore [representatives’] availability and schedules in assigning cases because failure to do so would inevitably delay cases.”^[40]  Reading the award as a whole, including the Arbitrator’s express conclusion that the Union had not shown a violation of the APA, we find that the Arbitrator concluded that the case‑assignment system complied with the APA and the parties’ agreement, despite that system’s potential flaws.

Next, the Union argues that the Arbitrator “[d]isregarded” the APA’s rotational case-assignment requirement.^[41]  The Union claims the award is contrary to the APA because assigning cases based on matching representative and ALJ availability is not consistent with assigning cases “in rotation.”^[42]  The Union also claims that the Arbitrator interpreted the APA’s “so far as practicable” wording to mean that the APA’s requirements are met “as long as [the case-assignment system] does not result in automatic bias or inevitable forum shopping.”^[43]

The APA states that “[ALJs] shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable,” but does not define “in rotation.”^[44]  The APA’s legislative history indicates that the rotation requirement is intended to prevent “an agency from disfavoring an [ALJ] by rendering him inactive”^[45] and “[t]o [e]nsure equality of participation among [ALJs] in the hearing and decision of cases.”^[46]  Apart from this purpose, there is nothing in the legislative history that demonstrates that Congress was concerned with parties manipulating the case-assignment process of ALJs.

Further, in Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference (Ramspeck),^[47] the U.S. Supreme Court held that the phrase “so far as practicable” informs the interpretation of “in rotation” and allows agencies to base case assignments on factors “beyond the mere mechanics of bringing the next case on the docket opposite the top name on the register of available” ALJs.^[48]  The Court explained that the “so far as practicable” language permits case assignments to be informed by other relevant factors, such as the complexity and difficulty of the case and the experience and ability of the ALJ.^[49]  In line with Ramspeck, federal courts have held that the “so far as practicable” language permits case assignments to be informed by considerations within an agency’s control, relevant to the particular assigning agency,^[50] so long as the assignment is not made with “the intent or effect of interfering with the independence of the ALJ or otherwise depriving a party of a fair hearing.”^[51]  For instance, in Tractor Training Service v. Federal Trade Commission, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “economical operation” of the agency was a permissible factor for an agency’s decision “to deviate from mechanical rotation” of case assignments when it reassigned a case from one geographical location to a different ALJ geographically located closer to where future hearings were scheduled.^[52]  In Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that it was “practicable” to reassign a case to a different ALJ on remand after the agency considered such permissible factors as the presiding ALJ’s “proven inability to cut through [claimant’s] dilatory tactics and move the proceedings along.”^[53]  In Sykes v. Bowen, noting considerations such as the “complexity of the case as well as the experience and ability of the ALJ,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that reassignment of a case on remand to the same ALJ who presided over the claimant’s initial hearing did not violate the APA and the claimant was given a “full and fair hearing.”^[54]  Finally, in Chocallo v. Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, SSA, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that efficient case-management considerations, such as attaining equitable caseloads and avoiding case backlogs, warranted an agency’s departure from rotational distribution of cases to ALJs.^[55]

As discussed above, the Arbitrator considered the Agency’s arguments that the case-assignment system was rotational “so far as is practicable” because the Agency assigns cases to the next available ALJ after considering availability and “other considerations agreed to” by the parties.^[56]  The Arbitrator found that cases are assigned to the next ALJ in succession who matches a representative’s availability and who satisfies the applicable considerations agreed to by the parties.^[57]  We find that the Agency’s consideration of representative availability as part of its assignment process is consistent with the APA’s “so far as practicable” wording,^[58] as interpreted by federal courts.  Although the Union asserts that this process is not rotational, its arguments do not demonstrate that any deviation from a mere mechanical rotation, such as the successive assignment in the case‑assignment system, is inconsistent with the APA’s rotation requirement.

Nevertheless, the Union also argues that several of the Arbitrator’s alleged findings, and evidence supporting those “findings,” demonstrate that the Agency’s case‑assignment system is inconsistent with the APA’s rotation requirement.^[59]  These findings, according to the Union, indicate that the “Agency’s case[-]assignment system is flawed and could result in the harms the APA’s rotational requirement was designed to avoid, such as forum shopping,” “unequal case assignment,”^[60] and “bias.”^[61]  But the Union misunderstands the award.  While the Arbitrator expressed “concerns” about “potential flaws in the case[-]assignment system,” he ultimately found that the Union failed to provide sufficient record evidence of actual forum shopping, inequitable distribution of cases, or bias.^[62]  Because the Union’s arguments misunderstand the award, they do not demonstrate that the award is contrary to law.^[63]  

Finally, the Union asserts that “unrebutted testimony” established that the Agency’s pre-2023 assignment methods allowed “a rotation of case assignments that protected against representatives choosing [preferred] ALJs,” and, thus, demonstrated that “there is no credible claim . . . that it is not practicable to assign cases in rotation.”^[64]  But the Union does not cite any authority for the notion that an agency can never decide that its existing case-assignment system is impracticable and change to a different system that it believes will be practicable.  Thus, the Union’s assertion provides no basis for finding the award contrary to the APA.

We deny the contrary-to-law exception.^[65]

B.                 The Union does not demonstrate that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority.

The Union argues that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority for several reasons.^[66]  Arbitrators exceed their authority when, as relevant here, they fail to resolve an issue submitted to arbitration, resolve an issue not submitted to arbitration, or disregard specific limitations on their authority.^[67]  When parties do not stipulate to the issues, arbitrators have the discretion to frame them, and the Authority accords the arbitrator’s formulation substantial deference.^[68]  The Authority has held that arbitrators do not exceed their authority where the award is directly responsive to the formulated issues.^[69]  Further, disagreements with an arbitrator’s evaluation of the evidence do not demonstrate that the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority.^[70]  And the Authority has denied exceeded‑authority exceptions where the excepting party’s arguments misinterpreted the arbitrator’s award.^[71]

The Union asserts that the Arbitrator failed to resolve the issue presented in the grievance and grievance response, which was whether the Agency’s case-assignment system comports with the APA’s requirement that cases be assigned in rotation.^[72]  However, as discussed previously, the Arbitrator did address that issue.  Therefore, the Union’s assertion misinterprets the award and provides no basis for finding that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority.^[73]

Additionally, the Union argues that the Arbitrator resolved an issue not submitted to arbitration because the framed issue was “an obvious misstatement of the issue.”^[74]  As previously noted, the parties did not stipulate to the issue, so the Arbitrator framed the pertinent issue as whether “the Agency should – or must – assign cases in the order in which they come into the office, prior to contact between an Agency scheduler and [representatives].”^[75]  According to the Union, the issue raised in the grievance was “whether the Agency was assigning in rotation,” not the method or timing of assignments.^[76]  However, the Union’s grievance alleged that consideration of representative availability before assigning cases to ALJs was impermissible.^[77]  Therefore, the Arbitrator’s formulation of the issue is consistent with the grievance.  As such, the Union’s argument provides no basis for finding the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by resolving an issue not submitted to arbitration.^[78]

Next, the Union argues that the Arbitrator “impos[ed] an improper standard of proof on the Union” by requiring the Union to “present ‘statistical evidence,’ when both parties conceded [that] no statistical evidence exists.”^[79]  The Union identifies record evidence it introduced, and asserts that the Arbitrator failed to assess the credibility or weight of some of that evidence, including unrebutted testimony from the Union’s expert witness.^[80]  Further, the Union claims that the award is “internally inconsistent” because the Arbitrator found that the Union introduced credible evidence of various concerns with the case-assignment system, yet he concluded that the Union failed to present sufficient evidence to establish violations.^[81]  According to the Union, the record and the Arbitrator’s own findings demonstrate that the Union met its burden of proof.^[82]

If a standard of proof is set forth in law, rule, regulation, or a collective‑bargaining agreement, then an arbitrator’s failure to apply the prescribed standard will constitute a basis for finding the award deficient.^[83]  However, the Authority has held that in the absence of a specified standard of proof, arbitrators have the authority to establish whatever standard they consider appropriate, and the Authority will not find an award deficient based on a claim that an arbitrator applied an incorrect standard.^[84]  The Union does not cite any specific limitations on the Arbitrator’s authority to apply the evidentiary standard that he applied.  Therefore, we do not find that the Arbitrator disregarded any such limitations.^[85]  Further, the Union’s arguments that challenge the Arbitrator’s evaluation of the evidence provide no basis for finding the Arbitrator exceeded his authority.^[86]

We deny the exceeded-authority exception.

C.                 The Union does not demonstrate that the award is based on nonfacts.

The Union argues that the award is based on several nonfacts.^[87]  To establish that an award is based on a nonfact, the excepting party must show that a central fact underlying the award is clearly erroneous, but for which the arbitrator would have reached a different result.^[88]  Disagreement with an arbitrator’s evaluation of evidence, including the weight to be accorded such evidence, does not provide a basis for finding that an award is based on a nonfact.^[89]  The Authority also rejects nonfact exceptions that challenge alleged findings that an arbitrator did not actually make,^[90] or that challenge an arbitrator’s legal conclusion.^[91]  Further, the Authority has found that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issues before him or her is not a matter that can be challenged on nonfact grounds.^[92]  Moreover, arguments based on a misunderstanding of an award do not demonstrate that the award is based on nonfacts.^[93]

The Union claims that the Arbitrator’s findings that the Union’s evidence was “anecdotal,” “subjective in nature,” and “not supported by adequate data/statistics” are based on a nonfact because the Union “submitted documentary evidence as well as unrebutted expert testimony” that was “neither subjective in nature nor anecdotal.”^[94]  As these claims challenge the Arbitrator’s evaluation of evidence, they do not demonstrate that the award is based on a nonfact.^[95]

In addition, the Union argues that the Arbitrator based his “phrasing of the [pertinent] issue” on the nonfact that the Union demanded that the Agency revert to its previous method of assigning cases.^[96]  According to the Union, it “never sought relief that would dictate the manner of assignment.”^[97]  However, the Union does not specify any finding made by the Arbitrator regarding the Union’s position on assignment method, and only cites the portion of the award that states the pertinent issue as framed by the Arbitrator.^[98]  To the extent the Union is challenging a finding that the Arbitrator did not actually make, that challenge does not establish that the award is based on a nonfact.^[99]  And to the extent that the Union is challenging the Arbitrator’s formulation of the issue, that formulation cannot be challenged on nonfact grounds.^[100]  Thus, we reject the Union’s arguments.

Next, the Union challenges as a nonfact the Arbitrator’s statement that “he accepts that Agency management may in some way need to consider [representatives’] availability when assigning cases to ALJs.”^[101]  For support, the Union asserts that “representative availability is not a condition for assignment within the APA”; and “for decades, the Agency assigned cases in rotation without regard to availability,” which demonstrates that such a case-assignment system is “practicable” under the APA.^[102]  However, the Union provides no basis for concluding that the Arbitrator clearly erred in finding that – despite the Agency’s prior use of a different case-assignment system – the Agency “may in some way need to consider [representatives’] availability when assigning cases” in order to more effectively conduct its work.^[103]  As the Union has not demonstrated that the Arbitrator made a clearly erroneous factual finding in this regard, it does not demonstrate that the award is based on a nonfact.^[104]  Further, to the extent that the Union is challenging the Arbitrator’s legal conclusion that the Agency did not violate the APA, that conclusion may not be challenged on nonfact grounds.^[105]

The Union further asserts that the Arbitrator “recognized the error of his rationale by acknowledging that ‘[c]onsideration of [representatives’] availability cannot . . . prejudice the system of adjudication and must not undermine the fair and equitable assignment of cases.”^[106]  However, when read in context, the Arbitrator’s statement is not an admission of error, but rather an explanation as to when consideration of availability in determining case assignments is appropriate.  Therefore, the Union’s argument misunderstands the award, and does not demonstrate that the Arbitrator’s statement is a nonfact.^[107]

Finally, the Union challenges as a nonfact the Arbitrator’s statement that “[t]he Union grieves a change made in the [Agency’s] procedures from assigning ALJs to cases on a strict [FIFO] basis or rotational basis – to one in which consideration is given to the availability of [representatives] before assigning ALJs cases.”^[108]  According to the Union, the grievance did not challenge an alleged failure to follow FIFO order in assigning cases, but merely concerned the Agency’s alleged failure to assign cases in rotation.^[109]  However, the grievance referenced both FIFO order and a rotational basis for assignment.^[110]  Even assuming that the Arbitrator’s interpretation of the grievance is a factual finding, the Union does not demonstrate that interpretation is clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, the Union’s challenge lacks merit.^[111]

We deny the nonfact exception.

D.                The Union does not demonstrate that the award fails to draw its essence from the parties’ agreement.

The Union argues that the award fails to draw its essence from Articles 5.B, 13.B, and 16.1.A.3 of the parties’ agreement.^[112]  The Authority will find an award fails to draw its essence from a collective-bargaining agreement when the excepting party establishes that the award:  (1) cannot in any rational way be derived from the agreement; (2) is so unfounded in reason and fact and so unconnected with the wording and purposes of the agreement as to manifest an infidelity to the obligation of the arbitrator; (3) does not represent a plausible interpretation of the agreement; or (4) evidences a manifest disregard of the agreement.^[113]  Mere disagreement with an arbitrator’s interpretation does not establish the award fails to draw essence from the agreement.^[114]  Further, exceptions that are based on a misinterpretation of an award do not provide a basis for finding the award deficient on essence grounds.^[115]

As described previously, the above-cited provisions all provide, in pertinent part, that ALJs “shall be assigned cases in rotation so far as practicable.”^[116]  According to the Union, the Arbitrator failed to address whether cases are assigned “in rotation,” and the award permits the Agency to assign cases in a manner contrary to the cited provisions’ requirement to assign cases in rotation.^[117]  The Union asserts that the Arbitrator addressed only Article 5.A’s requirement that the case-assignment system be “fair and equitable.”^[118]

As discussed in Section III.A., above, the Arbitrator addressed whether cases are assigned “in rotation” under the case-assignment system.^[119]  Thus, the Union is incorrect in arguing that the Arbitrator failed to address that issue.  As for the merits of the Arbitrator’s resolution of that issue, the Union does not identify any contractual wording that requires the Agency to use a specific manner of rotation when assigning cases, such that the Arbitrator was required to reach a different conclusion than he did.  Nor does the Union otherwise demonstrate that this aspect of the award is irrational, unfounded, implausible, or in manifest disregard of the parties’ agreement.  Accordingly, these Union arguments do not establish that the award fails to draw its essence from the parties’ agreement.^[120]

Additionally, the Union asserts that, by requiring the Union to present statistical evidence, the Arbitrator imposed an evidentiary standard on the Union that is not contained in the parties’ agreement.^[121]  The Authority has explained that, “[i]n the absence of any established burden of proof, an arbitrator is free to determine which party is required to bear the burden of proof regarding a specific issue.”^[122]  Accordingly, the Authority has denied essence exceptions where the excepting party fails to identify any contract provision requiring a particular burden of proof.^[123]  The Union does not identify any provision that required the Arbitrator to apply a particular burden of proof.  Therefore, the Union’s argument does not demonstrate that the award fails to draw its essence from the parties’ agreement.^[124]

We deny the essence exception.

IV.       Decision

We deny the Union’s exceptions.

Member Arrington, concurring:

I am happy to concur with my colleagues and make this decision unanimous.  This case, my first as a new Member of the Authority, provides an excellent opportunity to emphasize that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Statute) “should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirement of an effective and efficient Government.”^[125]

As a tenured government employee, it does not get any more simplistic than the term public service.  When I started working for the U. S. federal government over twenty‑five years ago, we still took an actual oath of office for every job, and we did it in front of the American flag.  It is an oath I have taken so many times that, at my most recent swearing in, I was able to recite it from memory without prompting.  It is not an accident, that when Congress wrote and enacted the Statute, it placed at the forefront the following tenets:  safeguarding the public interest, ensuring the effective conduct of public business, demanding the highest standards of employee performance, promoting modern and progressive work practices, maintaining efficient operations, and required an effective and efficient government.^[126]

As someone who has been a public-service customer and employee, a member of the military, a union official and a management official, a Wage Grade employee and a General Schedule employee, a supervisor, a member of the Senior Executive Service, a career employee, and now a Senate confirmed‑presidential appointee, I bring a unique perspective and understanding of the federal government’s inner workings, both what it is and what it can be.  Every stride forward in public service is driven by dedicated, mission‑oriented employees.  Unfortunately, the opposite can also be true, and it is the obligation and responsibility of every public servant to address and remedy such actions and situations to safeguard the public interest.  As a taxpayer, customer, and employee, I understand that public service requires that the needs of taxpayers and the American public come first; this is precisely what § 7101 of the Statute requires.

In order to safekeep the taxpayer’s interests and fulfill the Authority’s mission, we must weigh the interests of every group who has a vested interest in labor relations.  The construction of the Federal Labor Relations Authority’s (FLRA) seal embodies this principle:  the cogwheel represents the production of work and progress in labor relations; the gavel symbolizes management; the wrench represents labor; and the torch represents the FLRA’s responsibility for new ideas and leadership.  Consistent with the Arbitrator’s finding in this case that “[i]t is not practicable to ignore [representatives’] availability and schedules in assigning cases” because to do so “would inevitably delay cases to claimants’ detriment,”^[127] we must remain focused on our mission to provide fair, timely case processing that advances an effective, efficient government.

In a time of conflict, ego, and competing agendas, we are best served by returning to the basics of public service, which is safeguarding American taxpayers and putting their needs first.  At my Senate confirmation hearing, I was asked essentially one core question:  Would I follow the law?  The answer was an emphatic yes.  Chapter 71 of title 5 of the U.S. Code – specifically § 7101 – remains intact and will be well guarded on my watch.

Thank you.  A humble public servant.