American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3403 (Union) and United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, National Institute of Food and Agriculture (Agency)

74 FLRA No. 77

AMERICAN FEDERATION

OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

LOCAL 3403

(Union)

and

UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

(Agency)

0‑NG‑3576

_____

DECISION AND ORDER

ON A NEGOTIABILITY ISSUE

September 10, 2026

_____

Before the Authority:  Colleen Duffy Kiko, Chairman,

and Anne Wagner and Charles O. Arrington, Members

(Member Arrington concurring; Member Wagner concurring in part and dissenting in part)

I.               Statement of the Case

This matter is before the Authority on a negotiability appeal filed by the Union under § 7105(a)(2)(E) of the Federal Service Labor‑Management Relations Statute (the Statute).^[1]  The Union’s petition for review (petition) concerns one provision about union‑dues revocations that the Agency head disapproved under § 7114(c) of the Statute.^[2]  For the following reasons, we find that the provision is contrary to § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations.^[3]

II.             Background

Section 7115 of the Statute concerns an employee’s “written assignment” authorizing an agency to withhold union dues from the employee’s pay and provides that, except under certain circumstances, “any such assignment may not be revoked for a period of [one] year.”^[4]  The Authority had previously held that such wording “must be interpreted to mean that authorized dues [assignments] may be revoked only at intervals of [one] year.”^[5]  However, in 2020, the Authority issued OPM, rejecting that interpretation of § 7115 and finding:

it would assure employees the fullest freedom in the exercise of their rights under the Statute if, after the expiration of the initial one-year period during which an assignment may not be revoked under § 7115(a), an employee had the right to initiate the revocation of a previously authorized dues assignment at any time that the employee chooses.^[6]

Shortly thereafter, the Authority commenced notice‑and‑comment rulemaking concerning § 7115(a), and issued a final rule adding a new provision – § 2429.19 – to the Authority’s Regulations.  Section 2429.19 provides that “after the expiration of the one-year period during which an assignment may not be revoked under 5 U.S.C. [§] 7115(a), an employee may initiate the revocation of a previously authorized assignment at any time that the employee chooses.”^[7]

After the parties executed a collective‑bargaining agreement, the Agency head disapproved the provision under § 7114(c) of the Statute.^[8]  The Statute requires that “[a]n agreement between an[] agency and an exclusive representative shall be subject to approval by the head of the agency.”^[9]  Additionally, § 7114(c) of the Statute provides an agency head with thirty days to approve an executed agreement if it “is in accordance with [the Statute] and any other applicable law, rule, or regulation.”^[10]  As such, and as relevant here, an agency head can disapprove an executed agreement if it conflicts with a government-wide regulation.^[11]

The Union then filed the petition, and the Agency filed a statement of position (statement) arguing that portions of Sections 5(A) and (D) of the disapproved provision are contrary to § 2429.19.  The Union filed a response to the Agency’s statement (response).  The Agency did not file a reply to the Union’s response.  Pursuant to § 2424.23 of the Authority’s Regulations, Authority representatives conducted a post‑petition conference (conference) with the parties.^[12]  At the conference, the parties agreed that the wording of the provision was accurately stated in the petition.

III.         Preliminary Matters

A.           We deny the Union’s severance request.

In its petition and response, the Union states it is requesting severance of the provision.^[13]  The Authority’s Regulations, at the time the petition was filed,^[14] required a union to support a request for severance “with an explanation of how each severed portion of the proposal . . . may stand alone, and how such severed portion would operate.”^[15]  Here, the Union’s requests do not identify which portions of the provision it wants to be severed, nor do they address how any severed portion would stand alone or operate.^[16]  Rather, the Union’s requests for severance merely state that it “will provide [the explanation] at [a] later date,”^[17] and “[t]he provision is separate and distinct.”^[18]  Therefore, because the Union’s severance request fails to comply with the Authority’s Regulations, we deny the request.^[19]

B.           We deny the Union’s request for a hearing.

In its petition, the Union requests a hearing under § 2424.31(c) of the Authority’s Regulations “[t]o further examine the record.”^[20]  Section 2424.31 of the Authority’s Regulations states that a hearing may be appropriate “[w]hen necessary to resolve disputed issues of material fact in a negotiability . . . dispute, or when it would otherwise aid in decision making.”^[21]  As noted in the conference record,^[22] the Union acknowledges that there are no disputed issues of material fact,^[23] and we do not find a hearing would otherwise aid in resolving the parties’ negotiability dispute.  Therefore, we deny the Union’s request for a hearing.^[24]

IV.         The Provision

A.              Wording

          Section 5 – Cancelling Dues Withholding

          A.  The Union will provide the appropriate designated form to employees upon request.  An employee may cancel dues withholding once per year on the anniversary date by submitting the appropriate designated form to the Union.

          B.  The Union official will determine the anniversary date of the allotment by referring to the original form.  The ending date of the pay period in which the first anniversary date occurs will be entered on the form.

          C.  In accordance with 5 U.S.C[.] [§] 7115, employees may discontinue dues withholding after one (1) year as a dues paying BUE by following the procedures as outlined in this Section.

          D.  In order for dues deduction to be stopped on the first full pay period after the anniversary date, the SF-1188 must be submitted to the Union and the Labor Relations Officer no earlier than thirty (30) calendar days prior to the anniversary date.  SF-1188 forms submitted after the anniversary date will not be accepted.

          E.  Employees may rejoin the Union by resubmitting a new SF-1187.  A reestablished one (1) year anniversary period for dues withholding will then be established based on the new SF-1187.^[25]

B.              Meaning

One year after an employee has authorized dues withholding, the parties agree that the provision permits an employee to revoke authorization for dues withholding, but only during the thirty-day period prior to the anniversary date, and on an annual basis during the thirty‑day period before the employee’s anniversary date in each subsequent year.^[26]  Further, the parties agree that the provision does not allow employees to revoke their dues withholding outside of the thirty‑day annual period prescribed by the provision.^[27]

C.              Analysis and Conclusion:  The provision is contrary to § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations.

The Agency argues two sections of the provision are contrary to § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations because they allow unit employees to revoke the assignment of their dues only during an annual thirty-day period.^[28]  Specifically, the Agency argues that Section 5(A) of the provision is contrary to law because it permits employees to “cancel dues withholding once per year on the anniversary date by submitting the appropriate designated form to the Union.”^[29]  Further, the Agency notes that language in Section 5(D) of the provision contextualizes the intent of Section 5(A), stating that employees must submit the proper form no earlier than thirty days prior to their anniversary date “[i]n order for dues deduction to be stopped” and that “SF-1188 forms submitted after the anniversary date will not be accepted.”^[30]  In its response, the Union does not challenge the Agency’s assertion that the provision is contrary to § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations.^[31]  Rather, the Union argues that the Authority should overturn OPM and rescind § 2429.19, because they are contrary to the Statute, the legislative history for 5 U.S.C. § 7115(a), and Authority precedent.^[32]

As explained below, we find the provision is contrary to a government-wide regulation.  In doing so, we reject the Union’s arguments for overturning OPM and rescinding § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations.

Section 7115(a) states:

[i]f an agency has received from an employee in an appropriate unit a written assignment which authorizes the agency to deduct from the pay of the employee amounts for the payment of regular and periodic dues of the exclusive representative of the unit, the agency shall honor the assignment and make an appropriate allotment pursuant to the assignment. . . . Except as provided under subsection (b) of this section, any such assignment may not be revoked for a period of [one] year.^[33]

In OPM, the Authority found that, after the first year of dues withholding, § 7115(a)’s plain wording does not restrict the times at which employees may revoke dues assignments to only annual intervals.^[34]  Rather, the Authority found that the phrase providing that an assignment “may not be revoked for a period of [one] year” most reasonably establishes a single, initial one-year bar on revocation.^[35]  The Authority also noted that nothing in the text of § 7115(a), apart from the limiting conditions set forth in § 7115(b), expressly addresses revocations after that initial one‑year period.^[36]  The Authority emphasized that it should not simply “rubber‑stamp” old interpretations if they are not grounded in the Statute’s mandate to interpret the Statute in a way that promotes efficient and effective government.^[37]  Therefore, the Authority concluded that decisions requiring an “annual revocation window” – including U.S. Army, U.S. Army Materiel Development & Readiness Command, Warren, Michigan (Army)^[38] – reflected a policy determination, rather than a requirement compelled by the Statute’s text.^[39]

Thereafter, the Authority issued a final rule adopting § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations.^[40]  As relevant here, § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations states that “[c]onsistent with the exceptions in 5 U.S.C. [§] 7115(b), after the expiration of the one‑year period during which an assignment may not be revoked under 5 U.S.C. [§] 7115(a), an employee may initiate the revocation of a previously authorized assignment at any time that the employee chooses.”^[41]  The final rule noted that the legislative history of § 7115(a) of the Statute does not clearly support an interpretation of § 7115(a) that necessitates annual revocation intervals.^[42]  While a six‑month annual revocation window was mandated by the executive order that created federal labor‑management relations, the final rule noted that, when drafting § 7115(a), Congress did “not mention intervals at all.”^[43]  The final rule also explained that § 2429.19 would apply only to dues assignments that are authorized on or after the rule’s effective date.^[44]

Therefore, it is clear the provision is contrary to § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations because the provision would prohibit employees from initiating the revocation of a previously authorized dues assignment at any time that the employee chooses, after the one-year period of irrevocability.  However, as noted above, the Union argues that the Authority should overturn OPM and rescind § 2429.19.^[45]  As explained below, the Union’s arguments provide no basis for overturning OPM and rescinding § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations.

The Union, citing Authority precedent and reiterating points made by the dissent in OPM, argues that the legislative history of the Statute establishes that Congress intended for § 7115(a) to mean that authorized dues allotments may be revoked only at intervals of one year.^[46]  Similarly, here, the dissent maintains that Army and other Authority precedent establish that § 7115(a) authorizes the revocation of dues allotments only at one‑year intervals.^[47]  We disagree.  As noted above, the Authority in OPM considered Army and rejected its interpretation of § 7115(a), including its improper reliance on legislative history even when the text of § 7115(a) is clear.^[48]  In response to a petition filed by the National Treasury Employees Union, the Authority later issued a notice proposing to amend or rescind § 2429.19 and soliciting comments.^[49]  However, after receiving numerous comments in strong support of leaving § 2429.19 unchanged, the Authority withdrew the proposed rulemaking (the withdrawal).^[50]  In the withdrawal, the Authority noted that “[a]part from the comments received from federal unions, the vast majority of comments . . . supported maintaining § 2429.19 without change and opposed the imposition of additional restrictions on the ability of employees to cancel their dues assignments.”^[51]  Specifically, the Authority stated that thirty-three of the thirty‑nine “comments received from individuals and agencies . . . supported maintaining § 2429.19 without change, and did not support rescinding OPM.”^[52]  The Authority also rejected arguments – like those the Union and dissent raise here – in favor of overruling OPM and rescinding § 2429.19, and the reasoning set forth in that rejection applies equally here.^[53]

The dissent, citing Black’s Law Dictionary for the proposition that “period” can mean an interval,^[54] argues that the Statute’s use of “a period of [one] year”^[55] means that dues revocations can only occur on a yearly basis.  However, the example accompanying the dissent’s chosen definition of “period” includes an additional modifier that shows the cyclical nature of the length of time being discussed:  “the daily period of the circadian rhythm.”^[56]  For § 7115(a) to be comparable, it would need to prescribe “the yearly period of irrevocability” for an assignment.^[57]  Instead, § 7115(a) refers to “a” single one‑year period of irrevocability.^[58]  In an attempt to further justify its interpretation of § 7115(a), the dissent cites two U.S. District Court decisions that use the interval version of Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “period.”^[59]  But those cases do not involve disputes over the meaning of the phrase “a period of one year,” and neither case holds that “a period of one year” means “a recurring interval of one year.”^[60]  As such, we remain unpersuaded.

Additionally, Army’s reliance on the Statute’s legislative history is flawed and, therefore, the dissent’s reliance on Army is equally flawed.  The Senate-passed version of the legislation that led to the Statute expressly provided that dues assignments “shall be revocable at stated intervals of not more than [six] months.”^[61]  However, the House‑passed provision used the language ultimately enacted in § 7115(a) – that an assignment “may not be revoked for a period of [one] year” – and the House Committee Report stated that “[a]ssignments normally are to be irrevocable for one year.”^[62]  Therefore, Congress demonstrated that it knew how to prescribe recurring intervals but chose not to include that language in § 7115(a).  “Congress’s abandonment of the word ‘intervals’ supports a conclusion that [§ ]7115(a) prohibits revocation only for the first year after an assignment is authorized.”^[63]  Nevertheless, Army improperly imported the Executive Order’s recurring-interval mechanism into § 7115(a), even though Congress omitted from the Statute the language that created that mechanism.^[64]  Consequently, we find that Army did not properly interpret either § 7115(a) or its legislative history.

The dissent maintains^[65] that rescinding § 2429.19 “would not significantly upset any reliance interests.”^[66]  However, we reiterate that § 2429.19 has governed covered dues-assignment revocations for six years, that collective‑bargaining agreements containing prior revocation procedures have expired, and that employees have subsequently executed new assignments subject to § 2429.19.^[67]  Returning to Army would disturb a regulatory framework that has been implemented throughout the federal government, and the dissent does not explain how it would treat the assignments executed over the last six years under § 2429.19.

We also note the dissent acknowledges that no federal court has held that § 7115(a) requires annual revocation intervals.^[68]  Further, the dissent cites appellate decisions that merely described or applied the then‑controlling Army framework without independently resolving whether § 7115(a)’s text compels that framework.^[69]  Thus, those decisions establish only that courts applied Army while it remained controlling, not that they endorsed its reasoning.^[70]  Therefore, neither reliance on Army-based precedent,^[71] nor arguments based on “the text, purpose, and structure of the Statute,”^[72] persuade us that the Authority erred in promulgating § 2429.19.^[73]

The Union separately argues that because the provision does not conflict with the Statute, its inconsistency with § 2429.19 should not render it nonnegotiable.^[74]  The Union maintains that the text of § 7115(a) “contains no requirement that dues assignments become revocable at will after an employee’s first year of union membership.”^[75]  The Union further contends that the section does not – either implicitly or explicitly – “bar[] the negotiation of yearly dues[‑]revocation intervals.”^[76]  Rather, the Union asserts that § 7115(c) of the Statute “contemplates negotiation over those aspects of dues deductions not dictated by the Statute,” and that “[i]f Congress had wished to place additional, statutory restrictions on” annual revocation intervals, then it would have explicitly done so.^[77]  Noting that the title of § 7115(a) states it was made to “effectuate ‘[a]llotments to representatives,’”^[78] the Union argues that § 7115(a) should be read contextually as “exist[ing] for the benefit” of both unions and employees.^[79]  Therefore, the Union contends that the section should not be read as prohibiting annual revocation intervals.^[80]

The Union’s argument – which relies on § 7115(c)(1) – is unavailing.  That section states that “the agency shall have a duty to negotiate with the labor organization solely concerning the deduction of dues of the labor organization from the pay of the members of the labor organization who are employees in the unit and who make a voluntary allotment for such purpose.”^[81]  Nothing in § 7115(c)(1) conflicts with § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations or expressly authorizes what § 2429.19 forbids – restricting an employee’s ability to revoke a previously authorized assignment after the one‑year period of irrevocability.^[82]  As such, the Union’s argument is unpersuasive.^[83]

The Union further argues that “the Authority’s decision in OPM . . . infringes upon the rights of federal employees by limiting their constitutional and statutory rights to associate with their union.”^[84]  Citing § 7102 of the Statute, the Union claims that OPM interferes with employees’ rights under this section by limiting their ability to associate with and support their union.^[85]

Section 7102 of the Statute, however, is framed in terms of employee choice:  “[e]ach employee shall have the right to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity.”^[86]  Therefore, these statutory rights include the choice to join or assist a union, as well as the choice to stop associating with or assisting a union.^[87]  Section 7102 does not create a union entitlement to continued dues withholding, nor does it empower a union to convert an employee’s prior authorization into an ongoing, cyclical restriction on an employee’s ability to end dues withholding at a later date.^[88]  Moreover, Army did not discuss § 7102’s express protection of an employee’s right to refrain from assisting a labor organization.  In this regard, the rulemaking record for the final rule demonstrates why annual revocation periods are burdensome and why they limit an employee’s ability to easily exercise § 7102 rights:  (1) “[s]everal employees complained . . . it was difficult to determine their anniversary dates, as well as the window periods during which they were permitted to submit an SF‑1188, in order to be able to revoke their previously authorized dues assignments[;]”^[89] (2) commenters stated that “the unions . . . represent[ing] them were not helpful in determining the applicable anniversary dates or form‑submission window periods,” and that “the negotiated procedures for determining anniversary dates and window periods were not easily decipherable to a layperson.”^[90]

We also find the dissent’s reliance on AFGE, Council 214, AFL-CIO v. FLRA (Council 214) is misplaced.^[91]  In Council 214, employees authorized dues deductions as bargaining-unit employees, but the agency continued to make deductions after those employees were promoted to supervisory positions outside the bargaining unit.^[92]  The agency then reimbursed the employees and attempted to recover the mistaken payments by “deduct[ing] the amounts from the remittance to the union of dues withheld from other employees in a subsequent period.”^[93]  However, the court held that § 7115(a) “impos[ed] an absolute duty on the employer to turn over to the union all funds deducted” pursuant to those current employees’ valid assignments.^[94]  The court emphasized that § 7115 was designed for the “primary benefit and convenience of the employee,” that “[t]he employee has the right to decide whether to opt for withholding and to control the disposition of the funds so withheld,” and that the agency acts as the employee’s agent.^[95]  Thus, although Council 214 did not concern revocation windows, its reasoning reinforces – rather than undermines – OPM and its focus on employee choice.^[96]  More importantly, nothing in Council 214 supports converting an employee’s voluntary assignment into indefinitely recurring restrictions on the employee’s ability to terminate withholding after the one-year period prescribed by § 7115(a).

In sum, both OPM and § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations increase employees’ freedom of association by ensuring employees are not locked into recurring annual windows that limit when the employee may revoke their dues assignment.^[97]  Put simply, the Union’s interpretation of § 7102 restricts the statutory rights of federal employees by conditioning the practical exercise of their right to refrain from further union support on compliance with a narrow, recurring cancellation period.  As such, we deny the Union’s argument and find that § 7102 does not compel, or even support, that result.

Accordingly, because the provision explicitly provides that employees may revoke their dues assignments only during an annual revocation period, it is inconsistent with § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations.^[98]  Furthermore, we reject the Union’s requests to overturn OPM and rescind § 2429.19.^[99]  Therefore, because the Union’s request to sever the provision is denied, the entire provision is contrary to a government‑wide regulation, and we dismiss the petition.^[100]

V.           Order

We dismiss the Union’s petition.

Member Arrington, concurring:

I agree with the majority and write separately to emphasize practical considerations that reinforce today’s decision.  As I have previously stated, the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) should be interpreted in a manner that “safeguard[s] the public interest” and promotes an “effective and efficient Government.”^[101]  In doing so, we must equally consider the interests of agencies, labor organizations, and employees.^[102]

My experience as an employee, union official, management official, and supervisor has allowed me to view federal labor relations from multiple perspectives.  Those experiences reinforce a simple principle:  an employee’s decision whether to financially support a labor organization should not be unnecessarily difficult in either direction.  Section 7102 of the Statute protects an employee’s right “to form, join, or assist any labor organization,” while equally protecting the employee’s right “to refrain from any such activity.”^[103]  Section 7115(a) of the Statute should be interpreted consistently with either choice – that is whether or not to authorize dues withholding.

As the majority notes, the provision here effectively reverts to prior erroneous interpretations of § 7115(a) that prohibited employees from ending dues withholdings unless they acted during specific annual windows.^[104]  The Union’s position essentially locks the employee into a timeshare – easy to join; hard to get out.  I cannot agree that this is the function Congress intended when it passed the Statute.^[105]  This is further exemplified if we consider the reverse of the provision before us.  Suppose a negotiated agreement permitted a newly hired employee to begin dues withholding only during a narrow annual window.  An employee who missed that window could be forced to wait nearly a year before financially supporting the union.  Such a restriction would plainly burden the employee’s choice to assist a labor organization.  I see little reason to treat the opposite choice differently by interpreting § 7115(a) to impose unduly burdensome restrictions on an employee seeking to end dues withholding.  As noted by the majority, the previous interpretations of § 7115(a) did just that.^[106]

Congress required employees who authorize dues withholding to honor that decision for one year.^[107]  It did not expressly require employees to navigate recurring annual revocation windows thereafter.  Labor organizations have legitimate interests in financial stability, agencies have legitimate administrative interests, and employees have legitimate interests in exercising their statutory rights.^[108]  In my view, today’s decision appropriately balances those interests without imposing restrictions that Congress did not enact.

Member Wagner, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree that the Union has not demonstrated that a hearing is warranted in this case.  I also agree that the provision conflicts with § 2429.19 of the Authority’s Regulations.^[109]  However, as I have previously stated,^[110] I would rescind § 2429.19, along with the Authority’s related general statement of policy or guidance (policy statement) in OPM.^[111]

As the majority notes, in 2022, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) filed a petition, under § 2429.28 of the Authority’s Regulations,^[112] to amend § 2429.19.  On December 21, 2022, a majority of the Authority – with then-Member (and current Chairman) Kiko dissenting – issued a Federal Register notice granting NTEU’s petition, and proposing to:  (1) either amend or rescind § 2429.19, and (2) rescind the policy statement in OPM.^[113]  However, on March 5, 2026, the current majority of the Authority – over my dissent – issued a Federal Register notice (the 2026 notice) withdrawing the proposed amendment/revision to § 2429.19 and the proposed rescission of OPM.^[114]

It is worthwhile to restate here the reasoning underlying my dissent from the 2026 notice.  To begin, § 7115 of the Federal Service Labor‑Management Relations Statute (the Statute), titled “Allotments to representatives,” addresses how federal employees in appropriate bargaining units may, through written assignments, authorize federal agencies to deduct union dues from their pay – and how the employees may later withdraw those assignments.  Section 7115(a) pertinently provides that, with certain exceptions, those assignments “may not be revoked for a period of [one] year.”^[115]

In 1981 – early in the Authority’s history – the Authority addressed the meaning of the above-quoted wording “in the context of relevant legislative history and [f]ederal labor[-]relations policy.”^[116]  Specifically, in U.S. Army, U.S. Army Materiel Development & Readiness Command, Warren, Michigan (Army), the Authority noted that, before the Statute’s enactment, “procedures for payroll deduction for direct payment of employees’ union dues were governed by [§] 21 of Executive Order 11491, as amended” (E.O. 11491).^[117]  Section 21 of E.O. 11491 – entitled “Allotment of dues” – pertinently provided:  “When a labor organization holds formal or exclusive recognition [of employees], and the agency and the [labor] organization agree in writing to this course of action, an agency may deduct the regular and periodic dues of the organization from the pay of members of the organization in the unit of recognition who make a voluntary allotment for that purpose, and shall recover the costs of making the deductions.”^[118]  In addition, E.O. 11491 stated:  “Such an allotment is subject to the regulations of the Civil Service Commission [(CSC)], which shall include provision for the employee to revoke his authorization at stated six‑month intervals.”^[119]  Under E.O. 11491, “an agency could charge a union a service fee for making payroll dues deductions for the union’s members.”^[120]

In Army, the Authority stated that, under E.O. 11491, “[a]lthough voluntary and dependent upon a written agreement between the parties, a dues[‑]withholding provision operated as a union[‑]security measure designed to foster stability in labor-management relations.”^[121]  The Authority noted that, unlike E.O. 11491, § 7115(a) of the Statute “does not make dues assignments dependent upon a written agreement between the parties[,] but rather permits an employee in an appropriate unit to authorize dues allotments if he so desires.”^[122]

Looking to the Statute’s legislative history, the Authority in Army found that § 7115(a)’s wording “is identical to that contained in [§] 7115(a) of H.R. 11280 as passed by the House,” which “was unchanged from that reported by the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.”^[123]  The Authority noted that the House Committee Report stated that § 7115 “reflects a compromise between two sharply contrasting positions which the committee considered:  no guarantee of [dues] withholding for any unit employee and mandatory payment [of dues] by all unit employees (‘agency shop’).  The committee believes [§] 7115 to be a fair resolution for agencies, labor organizations, and employees.”^[124]  The Authority noted that the House Committee Report stated the following with respect to § 7115(a):

Subsection (a) provides that if an employee in an exclusively represented unit presents to the agency a written assignment authorizing the agency to deduct the labor organization’s dues from the employee’s pay each pay period, the agency must honor the assignment and must deduct the dues.  The decision to pay, or not to pay is solely the employee’s.  If the employee decides to have dues withheld, the agency must honor that decision.  The allotments are to be made at no cost to the employees or to the labor organization.  Assignments normally are to be irrevocable for one year.^[125]

The Authority noted that, by contrast, the Senate version of the bill:  (1) provided that assignments of dues allotments “shall be revocable at stated intervals of not more than [six] months”;^[126] (2) made agencies’ obligations to deduct dues “dependent upon the agency’s agreement to do so as part of a negotiated agreement”;^[127] and (3) was silent with respect to who would bear the cost of making dues allotments.^[128]  The Authority noted that the Conference Committee rejected the Senate version and adopted the House version unchanged.^[129]  However, the Authority also determined that, in its report, the Conference Committee “did not address the revocability of assignments of dues allotments.”^[130]

The Authority then stated:

In the Authority’s view, the language of [§] 7115(a) of the Statute and the legislative history cited above support the conclusion that [§] 7115(a) is intended to provide a more effective form of union security than previously existed, without going so far as to authorize an “agency shop.”  This conclusion is evidenced by the legislated change from a dues[‑]withholding provision under [E.O. 11491] which was contingent upon a negotiated written agreement to a statutorily mandated procedure for dues allotments, as well as by the fact that under the Statute, unlike under [E.O. 11491], dues allotments are required to be made at no cost to the union.  In the Authority’s view, consistent with this conclusion, Congress intended in [§] 7115(a) of the Statute to maintain the procedure for revocation of assignments set forth in [E.O. 11491] (i.e., only upon stated intervals of time), and to expand that interval under the Statute to a period of one year.  That is, the language in [§] 7115(a) that “any such assignment may not be revoked for a period of [one] year” must be interpreted to mean that authorized dues allotments may be revoked only at intervals of [one] year.  The Authority’s conclusion in this regard is consistent with the statutory purpose of providing a greater measure of union security, thereby fostering stability in labor-management relations.^[131]

The Authority noted that this conclusion also was consistent with guidance that the CSC – the predecessor to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) – provided to agencies near the time of the Statute’s enactment.  That guidance advised agencies to inform employees that, “after the next available six‑month revocation date established by the applicable collective[-]bargaining agreement, any future revocation can only be at one-year intervals from that date.”^[132]

The Authority applied the Army interpretation of § 7115(a) – allowing revocations only at one-year intervals – consistently for nearly four decades.^[133]  The Authority also held that “parties may define through negotiations the procedures for implementing” § 7115, as long as those negotiated procedures do not infringe on employees’ rights, including the right under § 7115 to revoke their dues assignments annually.^[134]

Then, in 2019, OPM asked the Authority to issue a policy statement regarding “the applicability of the First Amendment principles that the U.S. Supreme Court clarified in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 (Janus),^[135] to the revocation of federal employees’ union-dues assignments under § 7115(a).”^[136]  In 2020, a majority of the Authority – with Member DuBester dissenting – responded to OPM’s request by issuing the policy statement in OPM.  The majority rejected Army’s analysis and found that § 7115(a) “neither compels, nor even supports, the existing policy on annual revocation windows.”^[137]  Instead, the majority found that “[t]he most reasonable way to interpret the phrase ‘any such assignment may not be revoked for a period of [one] year’ is that the phrase governs only the first year of an assignment,” and that, “[e]xcept for the limiting conditions in § 7115(b), which § 7115(a) explicitly acknowledges, nothing in the text of § 7115(a) expressly addresses the revocation of dues assignments after the first year.”^[138]  The Authority then stated:

In our view, it would assure employees the fullest freedom in the exercise of their rights under the Statute if, after the expiration of the initial one‑year period during which an assignment may not be revoked under § 7115(a), an employee had the right to initiate the revocation of a previously authorized dues assignment at any time that the employee chooses.^[139]

However, the majority expressly declined to consider the legislative history that the unanimous Authority had discussed at length in Army, on the ground that § 7115(a)’s pertinent wording “is not ambiguous.”^[140]  The Authority majority stated that it intended to commence related notice-and-comment rulemaking.

Subsequently, on March 19, 2020, a majority of the Authority – with Member DuBester dissenting – did just that, publishing in the Federal Register a proposed rule with request for comments, with a very short comment period.^[141]  Then, on July 9, 2020, a majority of the Authority – again, with Member DuBester dissenting, and a mere two months after the close of the comment period – published § 2429.19 as a final rule in the Federal Register.^[142]  As relevant here, § 2429.19 provides that, after the expiration of the one-year period following an employee’s allotment, the employee “may initiate the revocation of a previously authorized assignment at any time that the employee chooses.”^[143]

The rule had an effective date of August 10, 2020, but stated that it would apply only to “the revocation of assignments that were authorized” on or after August 10, 2020, and would “not apply to the revocation of assignments that were authorized prior to” that date.^[144]  The rule also stated that, “[l]ike all government[‑]wide regulations, the rule [would] be subject to the constraints of [§] 7116(a)(7) of the Statute,” so “currently effective agreements [would] not be destabilized if they contain[ed] negotiated provisions that conflict[ed] with the rule.”^[145]  In this regard, § 7116(a)(7) of the Statute provides that it is an unfair labor practice (ULP) “to enforce any rule or regulation (other than a rule implementing [5 U.S.C. § 2302] which is in conflict with any applicable collective[‑]bargaining agreement if the agreement was in effect before the rule or regulation was prescribed.”^[146]

As noted above, NTEU later filed a petition to amend § 2429.19, and a majority of the Authority – with then-Member (and current Chairman) Kiko dissenting – issued a Federal Register notice granting NTEU’s petition.^[147]  In that notice, the Authority majority proposed to:  (1) rescind the policy statement in OPM; and (2) either revise § 2429.19 to provide that dues revocations may be processed only at one-year intervals or rescind § 2429.19 in its entirety.  The notice solicited, and received, comments on these proposals.  But, earlier this year, the Authority’s current majority – over my dissent (my March 2026 dissent) – issued a Federal Register notice withdrawing the proposal to amend/rescind § 2429.19 and to rescind OPM.^[148]

My March 2026 dissent summarized the comments that the Authority had received.  According to some comments, § 7115(a)’s legislative history – as discussed in Army and summarized above – supports a conclusion that Congress intended dues revocations to occur only at annual intervals.  Some comments cited the fact that CSC guidance, issued shortly after the Statute’s enactment, advised agencies that future revocations could only be made at one‑year intervals.  Further, some comments emphasized that the Authority followed Army for nearly forty years, with no intervening congressional action.  Additionally, some comments noted that union membership in the federal sector – and signing OPM’s Standard Form (SF)‑1187, to authorize dues deductions – is voluntary, as the terms of the SF-1187 and the SF-1188 (the form to withdraw dues-deduction authorizations) confirm.  Consequently, some comments contended that Janus has no bearing on federal-sector dues allotments.  In this connection, some comments asserted that the proposed amendment to § 2429.19 would respect employee rights under § 7102 of the Statute^[149] because employees would remain free to refrain from joining or assisting a union, as § 7102 guarantees.^[150]

In addition, some comments supported amending or rescinding § 2429.19 because doing so would allow parties to bargain over dues-revocation arrangements, rather than prohibiting any such arrangements that conflict with § 2429.19.  Moreover, some comments asserted that amending or rescinding § 2429.19 would not upset reliance interests, because the rule established by § 2429.19 had taken effect in only a limited number of bargaining units, given the Authority’s statement that it applies only to bargaining units where collective‑bargaining agreements with conflicting provisions have expired, and only to dues assignments authorized on or after the rule’s effective date of August 10, 2020.

Further, some comments argued that either rescinding or amending § 2429.19 is necessary to restore unions’ financial security and predictability, enhance unions’ bargaining postures, and honor employee choice.  Relatedly, some comments contended that strengthening unions’ finances benefits employees by allowing unions to better serve the employees they represent.  Additionally, one comment stated that complaints about the dues‑revocation process being too cumbersome or complicated are a “red herring,” and that arrangements in parties’ collective-bargaining agreements are workable if the parties understand the process and communicate it to employees.

Many of the comments arguing for amendment or rescission of § 2429.19 also made similar arguments in favor of rescinding OPM.  Additionally, some comments asserted that OPM is inconsistent with § 7115(a)’s plain language, which contains no wording that either:  (1) requires that dues assignments become revocable at will after an employee’s first year of union membership; or (2) bars the negotiation of yearly dues‑revocation intervals.  Further, some comments contended that OPM ignores that § 7115(a)’s purpose is to effectuate unions’ ability to collect dues through withholding arrangements.

In my March 2026 dissent, after considering those comments, and after great deliberation, I concluded that Army correctly held that § 7115(a) must be interpreted as allowing employees to revoke their voluntary authorizations only at annual intervals (unless an exception in § 7115(b) applies).  Nothing that the majority finds today persuades me otherwise.

Specifically, § 7115(a) does not state that a dues assignment may not be revoked “for one year”; it says the assignment may not be revoked “for a period of [one] year.”^[151]  While a “period” of time may denote “a length or portion of time,” it also may denote “[a] length of time characterized by regular recurrence or some cyclical process.”^[152]  And “a period of [one] year” can mean “annual” or an interval.  “Th[is] is a distinction without a difference, as the words ‘annual’ and ‘a year’ have the same meaning.”^[153]  “Of course, ‘Annual’ is defined as, ‘Of, relating to, or involving a period of one year.’”^[154]

In my view, the use of “period” in § 7115(a) means “[a] length of time characterized by regular recurrence or some cyclical process,” not a singular “length or portion of time.”^[155]  This is particularly true given § 7115’s legislative backdrop.  As discussed above, Army carefully analyzed § 7115(a)’s legislative history and found that history supported a conclusion that Congress intended § 7115(a) “to provide a more effective form of union security” than existed under E.O. 11491, “without going so far as to authorize an ‘agency shop.’”^[156]  “[C]onsistent with this conclusion,” the Authority found that

Congress intended in [§] 7115(a) of the Statute to maintain the procedure for revocation of assignments set forth in [E.O. 11491] (i.e., only upon stated intervals of time), and to expand that interval under the Statute to a period of one year.  That is, the language in [§] 7115(a) that “any such assignment may not be revoked for a period of [one] year” must be interpreted to mean that authorized dues allotments may be revoked only at intervals of [one] year.^[157]

As noted, the Authority also found this conclusion consistent with the guidance that the CSC gave federal agencies near the time of the Statute’s enactment.^[158]

I continue to find Army’s reasoning persuasive.  The pre-Statute regime, governed by E.O. 11491, had a framework similar to the one described in Army:  revocation intervals.  Army interpreted the Statute as superseding that regime only insofar as the Statute imposes one-year, rather than six-month, intervals.  Although the House Committee Report for H.R. 11280 stated that “[a]ssignments normally are to be irrevocable for one year,” it did not state that they are irrevocable for only one year.^[159]  Further, that wording could simply reflect Congress’s decision to increase the revocation intervals from six months to one year.  Under § 7135(b) of the Statute, “[p]olicies, regulations, and procedures established under and decisions issued under [E.O.] 11491 . . . shall remain in full force and effect until revised or revoked by the President, or unless superseded by specific provisions of [the Statute] . . . or decisions issued pursuant to [the Statute].”^[160]  In other words, Congress intended the pre-Statute regime to continue unless it was specifically superseded.^[161]  In effect, § 7135(b) creates a presumption that practices under E.O. 11491 should be preserved unless there is some clear statutory indication to the contrary.  Thus, “‘decisions issued under [E.O.] 11491’ supply critical guidance regarding the FLRA’s jurisdiction today.”^[162]  In that way, legislative history plays a significant role in interpreting the Statute.  And, based on that legislative history and the Statute’s wording, I would find that the Statute did not clearly supersede E.O. 11491’s interval framework, even though it extended the intervals from six months to one year.

Further, the Authority decided Army relatively shortly after the Statute’s enactment, giving extra weight to the interpretation in that decision.^[163]  Moreover – and significantly, in my view – the Army framework of annual revocation periods existed for nearly forty years without congressional action to change it.  This is true despite the fact that Congress has amended the Statute in other ways since 1981.^[164]  And, while no court has expressly held that § 7115(a) requires annual intervals, no court has held to the contrary either – and courts have applied the Army framework without critique.^[165]

Moreover, this interpretation of § 7115(a) is consistent with § 7101(a) of the Statute, which states that “labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest,”^[166] as well as with legislative history indicating that the Statute was “intended to serve a variety of purposes,” including “strengthen[ing] the position of employee unions in the federal service.”^[167]

Additionally, if Congress’ intent was to provide a greater measure of union security than what existed under E.O. 11491, then it would be counterintuitive for Congress to move from a system where employees could revoke their allotments only at intervals – even six-month intervals – to a system where the employees could revoke them any time after a single year.

Furthermore, despite some comments that we received to the contrary, the Army framework is wholly consistent with AFGE, Council 214, AFL-CIO v. FLRA (Council 214).^[168]  In discussing § 7115(a) of the Statute, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Council 214 stated, “The [S]tatute clearly was designed for the primary benefit and convenience of the employee.”^[169]  However, that statement must be read in context.  In Council 214, an agency erroneously continued to deduct union dues from employees’ paychecks for a short time following the employees’ promotions to supervisory positions.  When the error was discovered, management reimbursed those employees, and deducted the amounts from the remittance to the union of dues withheld from employees in a subsequent period.  The union challenged those deductions as a ULP.  The Authority rejected that challenge, finding that an agency may reduce remittances to a union of dues withheld from employees in order to compensate for the agency’s previous overpayments to the union.

However, the court reversed the Authority.  The court interpreted § 7115(a) “as imposing an absolute duty on the [agency] to turn over to the union all funds deducted.”^[170]  The court found that “the withheld dues are [not] union property until they are actually delivered to the union.”^[171]  In that context, the court stated:

The [S]tatute clearly was designed for the primary benefit and convenience of the employee.  The employee has the right to decide whether to opt for withholding and to control the disposition of the funds so withheld.  The [agency] acts as the agent of the employee with respect to the withheld funds.  In the words of the [S]tatute, the [agency] “shall honor the assignment.”^[172]

The court then “agree[d] with the [U.S. Court of Appeals for the] Second Circuit that ‘shall honor’ indicates a ‘mandatory intent’; the [agency’s] obligation to honor the dues check‑off is ‘nondiscretionary.’”^[173]

Put simply, Council 214 focused on employees’ right to have the dues they have authorized delivered to the union, without agency interference.  It did not involve dues revocations, and it provides no basis for finding that the Army framework of annual revocation intervals would conflict with employees’ rights.  In addition, although some comments supporting § 2429.19 and OPM cited private-sector precedent, Council 214 noted that § 7115 has no counterpart in the National Labor Relations Act or the Labor Management Relations Act.^[174]  Therefore, precedent under those acts does not dictate how § 7115 should apply.

Moreover – again, despite some comments to the contrary – the Army rule does not conflict with Janus, the First Amendment, or § 7102 of the Statute.  Janus involved the constitutionality of agency-fee payments required of state employees who chose not to join unions.  In the federal sector, the decision to join, or provide financial support to, a union is voluntary.  Janus itself acknowledged the voluntary nature of union membership in the federal sector, stating that state governments could “follow the model of the [f]ederal [g]overnment” by “keep[ing] their labor-relations systems exactly as they are,” so long as they do not “force nonmembers to subsidize public-sector unions.”^[175]  Courts have held that Janus does not apply to voluntary membership agreements; that dues assignments are voluntary, binding contracts; and that requiring employees to honor those assignments until the next annual revocation period does not force them to join or assist a union.^[176]  The SF-1187 clearly and expressly states that “[c]ompleting this form is voluntary.”^[177]  Further, there is no basis for finding annual revocation intervals conflict with § 7102 of the Statute.  I note, in this regard, that the ULP process remains available for employees to challenge any restrictions on dues revocation that unduly interfere with their § 7102 rights.^[178]

Additionally – despite some comments to the contrary – the Army framework does not conflict with the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.  As noted above, employees voluntarily sign authorizations for dues deductions, and none of the authorities cited in the comments support a conclusion that holding employees to their voluntary actions to enter into a binding contract, at least for some period of time, would be an unconstitutional “taking.”^[179]

For these reasons, I continue to believe that Army correctly held that § 7115(a) must be interpreted as requiring that employees may not revoke their authorizations except at annual intervals (unless an exception in § 7115(b) applies).  Thus, in my view, the former Authority majority erred when it promulgated § 2429.19 and issued OPM, and the current majority perpetuated that error by withdrawing the proposed amendment/rescission of § 2429.19 and proposed rescission of OPM earlier this year.  For the same reasons, I believe that the majority errs today, by rejecting the Union’s request that we rescind § 2429.19 and OPM.^[180]

Further, if the majority’s interpretation of § 7115(a) is correct – a point that I do not concede – then § 7115(a) does not address, in any way, what happens after the first year of dues withholding.  As such, the majority cannot rely on § 7115(a) as the statutory basis for § 2429.19 – a substantive rule that is entirely about what happens after the first year of a dues authorization, and that dictates what parties may or may not do, and may or may not bargain over and agree to, after that first year.  If there is another statutory grounding for § 2429.19, the majority has not said what it is.

Separate from the proper interpretation of § 7115(a), two additional considerations support returning to the Army framework.

First, doing so would not significantly upset any reliance interests.  Because the Army framework was in place for nearly forty years, innumerable existing collective‑bargaining agreements have dues-revocation provisions that were negotiated under that framework.  Additionally, as noted above, § 2429.19 does not apply to assignments that were authorized before the Regulation’s effective date of August 10, 2020, or to collective‑bargaining agreements that were in effect on that date.  As a result, returning to the Army framework would not significantly disrupt the status quo.

Second, some of the policy arguments raised in the comments that the Authority received support returning to the Army framework.  Specifically, as some comments state, prohibiting revocations except at annual intervals can allow unions to better estimate the dues revenue that they would receive over the course of a year, which can assist them in planning their budgets and give them the financial continuity that would encourage them to invest resources in representational activities that benefit unit employees, rather than holding off due to uncertainty regarding future funding.  It also could assist unions in complying with legal requirements governing the election of local union officers. Some comments note that, under the Labor‑Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, unions must finalize a list of members in good standing who are eligible to participate in union elections in advance of any election.^[181]  Allowing unions to rely on members’ dues‑withholding commitments could assist the unions in preparing and maintaining accurate lists.

Therefore, before resolving this case, I would have rescinded § 2429.19 and the policy statement in OPM, and returned to the Army regime.  Then I would decide this case and find that, because the Agency’s only argument regarding the provision is that it is contrary to § 2429.19,^[182] the provision is not contrary to law.  And, as the provision as a whole is not contrary to law, I would find it unnecessary to resolve the Union’s request to sever the provision.^[183]

Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.