24:0117(15)AR - Local 1749, AFGE and Commander, 47FTW, Laughlin AFB, TX -- 1986 FLRAdec AR
[ v24 p117 ]
24:0117(15)AR
The decision of the Authority follows:
24 FLRA No. 15
LOCAL 1749, AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Union
and
COMMANDER, 47FTW, LAUGHLIN
AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS
Agency
Case No. 0-AR-1209
DECISION
I. Statement of the Case
This case is before the Authority on an exception to the award of
Arbitrator Charles W. Tyer filed by the Agency under section 7122(a) of
the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute and part 2425 of
the Authority's Rules and Regulations.
II. Background and Arbitrator's Award
The issue submitted to arbitration was whether the 14-day suspension
of the grievant, a government procurement agent, for alleged deliberate
misrepresentation and concealment of a material fact in the purchase of
certain merchandise, was for just cause under the terms of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement and applicable regulations. The
Arbitrator found that the suspension was not for just cause and ordered
that the grievant be made whole for all backpay and other benefits lost
due to the adverse action. The Arbitrator further ordered that the
grievant be reimbursed for all attorney fees and other expenses releated
to this case which are appropriate under prevailing Federal regulations.
III. Agency Exception
In its exception, the Agency contends that the Arbitrator's award of
attorney fees is contrary to 5 U.S.C. Section 7701(g)(1). In support of
its exception, the Agency argues that the Arbitrator failed to supply a
fully articulated decision to support the award of attorney fees and
that the awrad "rests upon a cursory statement by the (A)rbitrator" and
is without the "required demonstrable pragmatic analysis of the facts
set out in applicable statutes."
IV. Union Opposition
The Union asserts in its opposition to the Agency's exception that
the Arbitrator's written response to the Union's Request for
Supplemental Decision, in which the Arbitrator made additional and
specific determinations relating to his award, satisfies the
requirements for sustaining the Arbitrator's award of attorney fees.
Alternatively, the Union requests that the Authority remand the case to
the Arbitrator if the Authority finds that the award does not meet the
requirements of 5 U.S.C. Section 7701(g).
V. Analysis and Conclusion
As we discussed in Naval Air Development Center, Department of the
Navy and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1928,
AFL-CIO, 21 FLRA No. 25 (1986), a threshold requirement for entitlement
to attorney fees under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 5596, is a
finding that the grievant had been affected by an unjustified or
unwarranted personnel action which has resulted in the withdrawal or
reduction of the grievant's pay, allowances, or differentials. Further,
an award of attorney fees must be in conjunction with an award of
backpay to the grievant on correction of the unwarranted or unjustified
personnel action. The award of attorney fees must be reasonable and
related to the personnel action, and in accordance with the standards
established under 5 U.S.C. Section 7701(g).
Section 7701(g) prescribes that for an employee to be eligible for an
award of attorney fees, the employee must be the prevailing party.
Section 7701(g)(1), applicable to all cases except those of
discrimination, requires that an award of attorney fees must be
warranted "in the interest of justice," that the amount must be
reasonable, and that the fees must have been incurred by the employee.
The standards established under section 7701(g) further require a fully
articulated, reasoned decision setting forth the specific findings
supporting the determination on each pertinent statutory requirement,
including the basis upon which the reasonableness of the amount was
determined when fees are awarded. An arbitrator's cursory statement
that the arbitrator considered the necessary elements of analysis does
not meet the requirement under 5 U.S.C. Section 7701(g) for a fully
articulated, reasoned decision. An arbitrator's award of attorney fees
must draw its essence from a demonstrable, pragmatic analysis of the
factors set out in the applicable statutes. Naval Air Development
Center, slip op. at 10-11.
In this case, the Arbitrator's statement concerning the award of
attorney fees does not meet the requirements just discussed. In
National Association of Air Traffic Specialists and Federal Aviation
Administration, Washington Flight Service Station, 21 FLRA No. 26
(1986), the Authority explicitly stated that in future cases, "if the
Authority finds that an award granting attorney fees is deficient
because it is not fully supported as required, the Authority will set
aside or modify the award as appropriate," rather than remand the award
to the parties for clarification and interpretation. Slip op. at 5. In
this case, as evidenced in management's brief before the Arbitrator, the
Agency specifically informed the Arbitrator that "should the
(a)rbitrator consider such (attorney) fees appropriate, the award must
comply with the requirements of 5 U.S.C. Section 7701(g) and the Federal
Labor Relations Authority as established in 21 FLRA No. 35."
(Management's Brief Before the Arbitrator, at 5, attached to Petition
for Exception.) The Arbitrator, therefore, was aware of his obligation
with applicable requirements. The failure of the parties to provide the
Arbitrator with a copy of the Authority's applicable rulings does not,
as the Union asserts, cure the deficiency, nor does it warrant a remand
of the case for clarification. Similarly, the Arbitrator's denial of
the Union's request for a Supplemental Decision, where he states that he
"has no further authority in this matter(,)" does not satisfy the
requirements for sustaining the Arbitrator's award of attorney fees.
The Arbitrator's award of attorney fees is deficient since it was not
made in accordance with the required standards.
VI. Decision
For the above reasons, the Arbitrator's award is modified by setting
aside the award of attorney fees. /*/
Issued, Washington, D.C., November 21, 1986.
/s/ Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman
/s/ Henry B. Frazier III, Member
/s/ Jean McKee, Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
--------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
(*) In view of the Authority's decision, the Agency's request for a
stay is denied as moot.